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Abstract
Children with lower socioeconomic status (SES) tend to benefit more from early child care, but are
substantially less likely to be enrolled. We study whether reducing behavioral barriers in the application
process increases enrollment in child care for lower-SES children. In our RCT in Germany with highly
subsidized child care (n > 600), treated families receive application information and personal assistance
for applications. For lower-SES families, the treatment increases child care application rates by 21 pp
and enrollment rates by 16 pp. Higher-SES families are not affected by the treatment. Thus, alleviating
behavioral barriers closes half of the SES gap in early child care enrollment.
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1. Introduction
There is mounting evidence that early childhood programs promote child development
and other important life outcomes (e.g., Currie and Almond, 2011; Fryer et al., 2020).
The positive effects of (universal) early child care programs are often larger for more
disadvantaged children (e.g., Currie, 2001), which implies that they can foster equality
of educational opportunity and societal equality (Bjoerklund and Salvanes, 2011; Heck-
man, 2011). However, in many countries, child care enrollment rates tend to be lower
for disadvantaged children (OECD, 2019, 2020; Cascio, 2021). For instance, in Germany,
the socioeconomic gap in early child care enrollment is 14 pp, although child care pro-
grams in Germany are universally offered, of high quality, and heavily subsidized (Jessen
et al., 2020).1 This socioeconomic gap in enrollment is highly policy relevant, because it
may render efforts to promote educational equality through offering or expanding public
child care programs (see, e.g., OECD, 2011; Cascio, 2021) ineffective. Yet, the causal
determinants of the socioeconomic gap in child care enrollment are largely unexplored.
A growing literature argues that behavioral barriers are important determinants of
socioeconomic gaps in educational choices and outcomes. In particular, individuals with
lower socioeconomic status (SES) may lack important information about the costs and
benefits of different educational programs, the application process, or their own suitability
and eligibility for such programs (Jensen, 2010; Bettinger et al., 2012; Hoxby and Turner,
2015). They are also more susceptible to behavioral patterns such as present bias and
overreliance on routines or defaults (Lavecchia et al., 2016). These factors may distort
the educational choices of lower-SES individuals and thereby exacerbate educational in-
equality, especially when application processes for educational programs are complex and
competitive. In this paper, we study whether helping families overcome such behavioral
barriers can promote socioeconomic equality in early child care enrollment.
We implemented a randomized controlled trial with more than 600 families in two
large cities in western Germany. We sampled families with children aged less than one
year from official birth registry data. Our setting is characterized by large socioeconomic
gaps in child care enrollment despite universal child care availability.2 At the same time,
1This gap refers to the enrollment difference between parents with and without a college entrance
qualification (“Abitur”; i.e., the school degree qualifying for university studies) for children below the age
of three years. Relatedly, Cornelissen et al. (2018) and Kline and Walters (2016) provide evidence for
Germany and the U.S., respectively, that children with greater potential gains from child care programs
are less likely to participate.
2Similarly, for Denmark, Heckman and Landersø (2021) highlight that advantaged families are better
able to access and utilize universally available education programs, such as universal child care, and
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application processes are decentralized, complex, and nontransparent, and competition
for a child care slot is high as average demand exceeds supply (see Section 2 for details).
Our treatment was designed to alleviate potential behavioral barriers to acquiring a slot
in early child care (i.e., center-based child care for children below the age of three years).
Specifically, we provided information about the child care system and the application
process, and offered customized assistance from a trained expert to help families to nav-
igate the child care application process.3 Importantly, the treatment was based on the
premise of not changing parents’ preferences related to child care (which is also confirmed
in our data). Our randomized treatment allows us to study the causal effect of alleviat-
ing behavioral barriers in the child care application process on application behavior and
enrollment. In light of the observed SES gap in child care enrollment, we investigate
treatment effects separately for lower- and higher-SES families. In our main specification,
we classify parents without a college entrance qualification as lower-SES (more than 40%
of the sample are categorized as lower-SES).
We find large, equity-enhancing effects of our treatment on child care application and
enrollment. Nine months after treatment, treated lower-SES families are 21 percentage
points (pp) more likely to apply for a child care slot and are 16 pp more likely to have
their child enrolled in child care, compared to lower-SES families in the control group.
Higher-SES parents are not affected by the treatment. In consequence, our intervention
fully closes the SES gap in child care application and more than halves the SES gap in
enrollment observed in the control group. Treatment effects on enrollment tend to be
stronger for those lower-SES families who are likely to benefit more from alleviating be-
havioral barriers (e.g., families with low initial knowledge about the child care application
process).
We also analyze potential mechanisms underlying the treatment effect on child care
enrollment for lower-SES families. We find that the treatment increases not only appli-
cation rates, but also the probability of visiting a child care center on-site during the
application process — an important factor for securing a child care slot, as documented
in our complementary survey among child care center managers in Germany (see Section
4.3). Our mediation analysis indicates that almost half of the overall treatment effect on
enrollment can be attributed to these two mediators. We also find that the treatment sig-
Walters (2018) shows that disadvantaged children are less likely to attend charter schools, a publicly
funded and non-selective type of school in the U.S.
3Our treatment is similar to the approach of Bergman et al. (2019), who investigate the effect of
randomly providing customized assistance on moving to high-upward-mobility neighborhoods among 430
low-income families.
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nificantly increases application knowledge. However, when considered jointly with child
care application and on-site visits, application knowledge accounts for very little of the
treatment effect. This finding suggests that improving application knowledge alone might
not be sufficient to increase enrollment chances of lower-SES families.
We confirm our main findings in a series of robustness checks. The treatment effects
remain significant when correcting for multiple hypothesis testing and when using ran-
domization inference. Our results are also robust to applying alternative SES definitions
based on the educational attainment of both parents, household income, and single-parent
status. Analyzing sample attrition (which is generally low in our study), we show that
attrition is independent of treatment status, and that results are robust to accounting
for attrition using inverse probability weighting and bounding analysis. In addition, we
investigate whether treatment effects on enrollment are driven by negative spillovers on
families in the control group. Leveraging data on the exact home locations of the families
in our sample, we find that child care enrollment rates in the control group are unrelated
to the share of treated families in close geographical proximity. This suggests that treat-
ment effects do not reflect displacement effects. Finally, evidence from our nationwide
survey with child care center managers indicates that the use of currently unfilled child
care slots (due to inefficiencies in the process of slot allocation) constitutes a likely reason
why our treatment does not induce displacement effects.
The paper contributes to the literature in three dimensions. First, we add to the
vibrant strand of research that implements educational interventions informed by be-
havioral economics principles to improve educational choices, performance, or attainment
(for extensive reviews of the behavioral economics of education, see Lavecchia et al., 2016;
Damgaard and Nielsen, 2018). One set of interventions aims to overcome informational
barriers that may lead students to underinvest in education by providing them with in-
formation, for instance, about the costs and benefits of education or program eligibility
(Jensen, 2010; Oreopoulos and Dunn, 2013; Dinkelman and Martinez, 2014; Hastings
et al., 2015; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). Although especially disadvantaged individuals of-
ten lack important information (e.g., Hoxby and Turner, 2015), purely information-based
interventions tend to show only modest (equity-enhancing) effects (e.g., McGuigan et al.,
2016; Kerr et al., 2020; Bergman and Chan, 2021; Lergetporer et al., 2021; Peter et al.,
2021). A second set of studies directly targets behavioral patterns, such as present bias
or overreliance on defaults, which may yield suboptimal educational choices, particularly
in situations where many choices are available and decision processes are complex. These
interventions usually induce small changes to the choice environment, for instance, by sim-
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plifying application processes, providing application assistance, or reducing uncertainty
related to admission or aid, and often yield large positive effects (Bettinger et al., 2012;
Hoxby and Turner, 2013; Castleman and Page, 2015; Pallais, 2015; Castleman and Long,
2016; Marx and Turner, 2019; Oreopoulos and Ford, 2019; Dynarski et al., 2021). While
this literature almost exclusively focuses on school or college choices, our paper is the first
to show that behavioral barriers play a crucial role in shaping educational decisions about
early child care use.4
Second, we contribute to the literature that targets parents to improve children’s skill
development and educational success. Parental inputs are particularly decisive in the
first years of a child’s life, and early socioeconomic differences in these inputs exacerbate
future inequalities (Suskind, 2015). Consequently, several interventions aim at improving
the productivity of parental investments in very young children, for instance, through
text-messaging interventions that break down complex parenting tasks into small steps,
or by providing financial incentives and training to engage parents in behavior that sup-
ports skill development (Fryer et al., 2015; Cortes et al., 2019; Doss et al., 2019; Mayer
et al., 2019; York et al., 2019). Related studies, focusing on school-aged children, provide
parents with information about their child’s academic progress to correct biased beliefs
and reduce monitoring costs (Bergman et al., 2018; Bergman, 2020; Bergman and Chan,
2021; Bettinger et al., 2021). This literature generally finds that modifying parental in-
vestment behavior yields large returns in terms of children’s cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. Instead of targeting direct parental inputs into children’s human capital produc-
tion, our intervention focuses on the alleviation of behavioral barriers that parents may
face when considering applying for a child care slot.5
4The fact that our intervention includes information provision about the child care application process
raises the interpretive question of whether it addresses mainly behavioral aspects as opposed to standard
information asymmetries. Note that the information we provide is publicly available and is generally
shared with parents. In the two sample cities, for example, officials distribute leaflets to all parents
when a child is born, informing them of their legal entitlement to a child care slot for their child.
In principle, it is possible that the potential failure of lower-SES parents to process this information
reflects behavioral biases, such as cognitive overload or recall bias (e.g., Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013).
Another behavioral channel through which information interventions can work is to reduce inattention by
increasing the salience of the targeted decision (Bettinger et al., 2021). Ultimately, we remain agnostic
on this interpretative issue, and, for simplicity, refer to the discussed barriers that parents may face when
considering to apply for child care as behavioral barriers (see Section 2.3 for details).
5In that sense, our paper is also related to the recent literature studying how complementing parental
investment with a university-student mentor affects outcomes such as prosociality or labor-market
prospects (Kosse et al., 2020; Resnjanskij et al., 2021).
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Finally, our study adds to the large literature on the effects of early child care on child
outcomes.6 There is ample international evidence that participation in both targeted
and universal (early) child care programs can improve skills and other life outcomes,
especially for children from disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g., Havnes and Mogstad, 2015;
Cornelissen et al., 2018; Felfe and Lalive, 2018; Drange and Havnes, 2019; Cappelen et al.,
2020).7 However, relatively little attention has been paid to the selection into child care.
While some studies document substantial SES gaps in early child care attendance (e.g.,
Magnuson and Waldfogel, 2016; Stahl and Schober, 2018; Jessen et al., 2020), the causal
determinants of these gaps are not yet well understood. We contribute to this literature
by showing experimentally that reducing behavioral barriers can mitigate the SES gap in
child care enrollment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institu-
tional background of early child care in Germany, explains the setting of our study, and
discusses (potential) behavioral barriers in the child care application process. Section 3
presents details on the implementation of our RCT and outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 4 reports our main results, subgroup analyses, mechanisms analysis, and extensive
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our results for
the design of universal social policies.
2. Institutional Background
In this section, we first provide a brief overview of the institutional background of
early child care in Germany. Then, we introduce our study setting and discuss potential
behavioral barriers in the child care application process.
2.1. Early Child Care in Germany
In Germany, early child care provision for under three year-olds (Krippe) is univer-
sal, that is, targeted at all children. Each child has a legal entitlement to a child care
slot starting from the age of one year. Similar to other countries with universal child
6The effectiveness of early educational investments is often rationalized by the notion that skill forma-
tion involves a process of “dynamic complementarities” by which skills attained early in life make later
human capital investment more productive (e.g., Cunha et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
7A common rationale for stronger effects on disadvantaged children’s outcomes is that these children
are exposed to less stimulating home environments, and that child care attendance therefore yields a
relatively larger increase in care quality for them (Cascio, 2015). Consistently, our baseline data show
that children from lower-SES families are much less likely than children from higher-SES families to
engage in conducive activities at home, such as reading or singing with their parents (see Section 3.2).
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care provision, such as Denmark (Heckman and Landersø, 2021), actual usage is far from
universal. About one-third of children under the age of three years attend child care.
Attendance rates increase sharply with age, from only 1% for children below the age
of one year, 29% for one-year-olds, to 55% for two-year-olds (Autorengruppe Bildungs-
berichterstattung, 2020). By the time children start school (around the age of six years),
almost all children in Germany have attended some form of child care. Thus, the most
likely counterfactual to early child care attendance is later attendance, not completely
abstaining from child care.8
Early child care in Germany is heavily publicly subsidized, with the public sector
bearing about three-quarters of the total cost (Spiess, 2013). On average, parents pay
effectively about 250 EUR (about 300 USD) per month for a child care slot (Felfe and
Lalive, 2018), and low-income families are eligible for lower fees or fee exemptions. In
the majority of cases, child care is provided either by municipalities (32%) or by publicly
subsidized, privately operated non-profit organizations such as ecclesiastical or charitable
organizations (50%). The remainder of child care slots are offered by private for-profit
providers or companies that provide child care for their employees on their premises
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2020). In general, the quality of early child
care is rather homogeneous across Germany and relatively high compared with other
countries, for example, in terms of group sizes and child-staff ratios (e.g., Felfe and Lalive,
2018).
The early child care market in Germany is characterized by rationing and decentralized
admission decisions (Jessen et al., 2020). While market characteristics vary substantially
across regions, average demand for early child care slots exceeds supply: Across Germany,
44% of parents express demand for a child care slot, but only 31% of children are actually
enrolled (Jessen et al., 2020). Because of their decentralized organization, child care
admission processes differ across region, by type of provider, and even across individual
child care centers. In cases where admission criteria are communicated, these often include
(full-time) employment of both parents, single-parent status, whether a child’s sibling(s)
already attend the same child care center, and — for ecclesiastical providers — religious
affiliation (Herzog and Klein, 2018). Given the unstructured and nontransparent nature
of child care application processes, it is often very difficult for parents to navigate the
8Recent evidence shows that even small advances in the timing of the start of early child care, for
instance, from the age of 19 months to 15 months in Drange and Havnes (2019), have pronounced positive
effects on child development.
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child care admission system — particularly for those who lack knowledge, time, financial
resources, or social capital.
In consequence, the allocation process of child care slots is criticized as being inefficient.
On the one hand, some families spend years on waiting lists before they find a child care
slot, despite their legal entitlement (Carlsson and Thomsen, 2015).9 On the other hand,
because admission decisions are often not coordinated among child care centers, some
families receive offers from multiple centers for their child, blocking access and increasing
waiting times for other families (Fugger et al., 2017).10 These inefficiencies could be the
reason why a surprisingly large number of child care slots in Germany remain unfilled,
despite the large excess demand for child care slots on average (see Section 4.4 for evidence
on the extent of unfilled slots).
Finally, differences in child care participation by socioeconomic background are pro-
nounced in Germany. For example, Jessen et al. (2020) document that children of parents
without college entrance qualification are 14 pp (∼37%) less likely to be enrolled in early
child care compared with children of parents with college entrance qualification (this gap
remains sizeable even after accounting for SES differences in demand for child care, see
Jessen et al., 2020). Our paper investigates the extent to which reducing behavioral
barriers in the application process causally affects this socioeconomic gap in child care
enrollment.
2.2. Study Setting
We implemented our experiment in two large cities (population > 100,000) in the
federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate.11 The share of children in Rhineland-Palatinate
enrolled in early child care (31%) is the same as the Germany-wide enrollment rate (Au-
torengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2020), while enrollment in the cities that we study
is somewhat lower (20–30%). There are about 200 early child care centers in the two cities
combined. Regulatory and quality standards for child care centers, as well as the admis-
sion processes, are similar in both cities. Both cities use a centralized online application
9Only very few families (<1%) try to sue for their legal entitlement to a child care slot in court (Jessen
et al., 2020).
10In the past few years, some municipalities (including the cities that we study; see Section 2.2) have
introduced centralized online application systems, but admission decisions usually remain decentralized
and uncoordinated (Fugger et al., 2017).
11The sociodemographic characteristics of the population in the two cities are relatively close to the
Germany-wide average; for instance, average age is 42.4 years (compared with 44 years in Germany),
mean equivalent household income is 1,610 EUR (compared to 1,880 EUR in Germany), and the fertility
rate is exactly at the German average of 1.6 (cf. INKAR, 2017). We address the issue of representativeness
in more detail in Section 4.4.
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system, but admission decisions are taken at the center level and are not coordinated
across centers. Child care in Rhineland-Palatinate is free of charge for children aged two
years and older. Before that age, fees are comparatively low and vary with family income,
the number of children in the household, and the number of requested child care hours
per week. Thus, in our setting, it is unlikely that child care costs are a major barrier to
child care participation for lower-SES families.
2.3. Behavioral Barriers to Child Care Enrollment
Behavioral barriers may play an important role in the process of acquiring a child
care slot. Competition for slots is high, application processes are complex and non-
transparent, and admission decisions are decentralized. To be successful in this market
environment, parents need to apply early, potentially send out several applications, and
have to keep track of the various deadlines, admission decisions, and waiting lists. The
process also requires completing lengthy paperwork, filing various legal documents, and
coping with setbacks and rejections. Acquiring a slot is likely to be more difficult for
lower-SES parents, because they usually have fewer resources available to invest in child
care applications (e.g., in terms of money, social capital, or time to make major life
decisions). In addition, lower-SES parents are more likely to be eligible for means-tested
child care fee reductions, and applying for these reductions involves additional paperwork.
Furthermore, lower-SES individuals are more likely to exhibit behavioral patterns such as
present bias and overreliance on routines (e.g., Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013), making
it harder to succeed in the application process. Lower-SES parents also tend to lack
relevant information about the child care application process: Our baseline data show
that, compared with higher-SES parents, they are significantly less likely to know that
they have a legal entitlement to a child care slot, that they do not have to apply at the
nearest child care center, and that fees are waived for children aged two years and older
(see Section 3.2 and Appendix Table A1).
For these reasons, we hypothesize that reducing behavioral barriers by providing par-
ents with information and application assistance can mitigate the existing socioeconomic
gap in child care enrollment.12 We consider behavioral barriers in the application process
12Consistent with the notion that these barriers can impede child care access, previous surveys in
Germany show that parents consider a lack of information about the application process and deadlines
to be an important obstacle (Camehl et al., 2018; Stahl et al., 2018). Similarly, studying barriers to
child care subsidies in the U.S., Shlay et al. (2004) find that many parents do not apply because they
erroneously think that they are not eligible or because they want to avoid the “hassles” of accessing the
subsidy system.
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Figure 1: Study Timeline and Procedural Details
as adding to other possible explanations of the SES gap in early child care enrollment,
which have been found to not fully explain the gap (e.g., SES differences in parental
demand, local supply shortages, and fees; see Jessen et al., 2020).
3. Study Design
In this section, we first describe the recruitment of our sample and the data collection
process. Then, we present sample descriptives, the design of the treatment, randomization
procedure and balancing, and the empirical strategy. We obtained IRB approval from the
Joint Ethics Committee of the Goethe University Frankfurt and the Johannes Gutenberg
University Mainz in July 2017, and preregistered our trial in July 2018, that is, prior to the
start of the baseline data collection (including treatment design, main outcomes, targeted
sample size, and a detailed pre-analysis plan for the collected data, AEARCTR-0003181).
3.1. Recruitment of Sample and Data Collection
Figure 1 depicts the timeline of the study. The sample frame consists of all 2,579
families with children born between July 1, 2017, and June 30, 2018, in the two sample
9
cities. Sampling was based on official birth registry data for the entire cohort obtained
from the municipal administrations. To initiate the recruitment of the sample, all families
received a postal invitation letter that informed them of the possibility of participating in
a university research project on “the life of parents of young children”. The letter provided
some basic information about the study, and announced that a staff member would visit
the families at home to conduct the first interview.13
Sample recruitment and the baseline survey were conducted between August and Oc-
tober 2018 by 10 specially trained interviewers. We randomly assigned each family in the
sample frame to one of the interviewers, who visited the families at their home address.
To achieve broad geographic coverage, we specified to each interviewer a different address
from which to commence the recruitment tour. We instructed interviewers to give re-
cruitment priority to parents whom we had identified as first-time parents in the registry
data, because we expected that their lack of experience as parents would make them es-
pecially vulnerable to barriers in the child care application process.14 When first meeting
a parent (in most cases the biological mother), the interviewer first inquired about her
willingness to participate in the study and asked her to read and sign the consent form.
Subsequently, the interviewer conducted the computer assisted baseline interview. The
median interview duration was 23 minutes, and parents were paid a participation fee of
20 EUR in cash. We recruited a total of 607 families (from a population of 2,579 families)
into our analytical sample, a participation rate of 24% (see Section 3.2 for a discussion of
selection into our sample).15 The randomized treatment was administered immediately
after the baseline survey (see Section 3.3).
We measured post-treatment outcomes between May and July 2019 through computer-
assisted telephone interviews, conducted by newly recruited, trained interviewers using
a university telephone laboratory. The survey was timed to capture detailed application
13The letter was addressed to the child’s mother, except in the rare cases where the child lived only
with the father. It included information about the study timeline, the institutions involved, the state
Ministry of Education’s support of the study, and that participation was voluntary. Importantly, it
did not reveal any details about the research question or the experimental nature of the study design.
When communicating with parents, we always referred to the study as “ELFE-Studie (Eltern, Leben,
Familie, und Erziehung)” (Parents, Life, Family, and Education), and used a professional corporate design
developed by a marketing company (see Appendix Figure F1).
14Specifically, we provided each interviewer with two unique address lists. The first list comprised
only first-time parents, and interviewers were instructed to focus recruitment efforts on this list. After
contacting each address on the first list, interviewers received their second list of non-first-time parents.
15An additional 15 families participated in the baseline survey. We subsequently had to exclude them
from the study for the following reasons: four children had severe disabilities, two were not living with
their parents but in assisted living groups, and nine moved out of the study area after the baseline survey.
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behavior and enrollment for the child care year beginning in August/September 2019,
which was the target of our intervention.16 The median interview duration was 40 minutes.
We paid parents a 15 EUR participation fee with vouchers for online or grocery stores
or by bank transfer. Of the families who participated in the baseline survey, 85.5% (519
out of 607) were reinterviewed in the post-treatment survey. This is a comparatively high
participation rate in general, but even more so when considering the relatively high share
of lower-SES families in our sample (see below). Moreover, our robustness analysis in
Section 4.4 shows that our experimental results are not affected by selective attrition.17
3.2. Sample Description
This section discusses basic sample characteristics, selection into the analytical sample,
and differences between lower- and higher-SES families.
Sample Characteristics. Column (1) of Table 1 shows the characteristics of our sample.
All values refer to the time of the baseline survey. In total, 48% of children are female,
and the average age is 6.9 months. Of those parents interviewed, 94% are the child’s
biological mother (the remaining 6% are the biological father), their average age is 31.5
years, 40% of them have a migration background (i.e., were not born in Germany), and 9%
are currently working. 58% of parents have a college entrance qualification, and average
net equivalent household income per month is 1,380 EUR.18 Regarding pre-treatment
values of the outcomes of interest, only a small share, 1.5%, of children are enrolled in
child care at time of the baseline survey.19 Application knowledge at baseline is relatively
low: on average, parents provide a correct answer to only 3.4 out of 6 (57%) knowledge
questions about the child care application process (see Table C3 for the wording of the
questions).
16In Germany, the main intake of children in early child care takes place each fall. Therefore, a “child
care year” is very similar to a “school year”.
17We took several steps to minimize sample attrition. As a general survey maintenance measure, we
sent all families holiday greetings cards using the study’s corporate design between both survey waves,
reminded parents to participate in the post-treatment survey, and contacted them at home if barriers
to participating via telephone existed. Furthermore, we conducted 21 (shorter) online interviews with
participants who could not be reached by phone. Our results are robust to adding survey mode fixed
effects and to excluding parents interviewed online.
18The equivalent household income is intended to reflect differences in household size and composition.
We divide total household income by the number of “equivalent adults”, using the OECD equivalence
scale. This scale gives a weight of 1 to the first adult in the household, 0.5 to each other person in the
household aged 14 years and older, and 0.3 to each child under the age of 14 years.
19We deliberately chose not to elicit application behavior in the baseline survey to avoid putting too
much emphasis on the study objective and thus shield against potential experimenter demand effects.
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Table 1: Sample Descriptives and Balancing Tests (Baseline)
All Control Treatment ∆(3)-(2) p-val for (4) p-val by SES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-treatment outcomes
Enrolled in child care 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.002 0.863 0.688
Application knowledge (# corr.) 3.448 3.477 3.422 -0.055 0.627 0.594
Application knowledge (Index) -0.018 0.000 -0.035 -0.035 0.691 0.560
Child characteristics
Age of child (in months) 6.869 6.992 6.758 -0.235 0.412 0.700
Child is female 0.484 0.495 0.475 -0.020 0.627 0.836
Parent characteristics
Parent is female 0.937 0.941 0.934 -0.006 0.745 0.559
Age of parent (in years) 31.51 31.19 31.79 0.60 0.165 0.419
Migration background 0.402 0.397 0.406 0.009 0.821 0.970
Parent currently working 0.087 0.094 0.081 -0.013 0.578 0.713
Household income 1380.7 1329.5 1426.6 97.1 0.120 0.343
No school degree 0.049 0.045 0.053 0.008 0.656
Lower secondary degree 0.135 0.139 0.131 -0.008 0.771
Middle secondary degree 0.229 0.237 0.222 -0.015 0.660
College entrance qualification 0.577 0.557 0.594 0.036 0.368
N 607 287 320
Notes: Table reports mean values for sociodemographic characteristics in our analytical sample at baseline. Column (1)
reports mean values for the full sample, Column (2) mean values for the control group, and Column (3) mean values for
the treatment group. In Column (4), we display the difference between treatment and control group, and Column (5)
shows the corresponding p-value of a two-sided t-test of the null hypothesis that values in Columns (2) and (3) are
equal. In Column (6), we test whether there are treatment–control differences in the respective variable within SES
subgroups. To do so, we regress the variable on the treatment indicator, a higher-SES dummy, and their interaction.
Column (6) reports the p-value of an F-test of joint significance of the coefficients on the treatment indicator and its
interaction with the higher-SES dummy. Enrolled in child care is a dummy equal to one if parents report that their
child is enrolled in child care, zero otherwise. Application knowledge (# corr.) is the average number of correctly
answered questions about the child care application process (out of six questions in total). Application knowledge
(Index) combines answers to all six application knowledge questions to an average of z-scores (standardized to mean =
0 and SD = 1 in the control group, Kling et al., 2007). Age of the child is the child’s age measured in months on August
1, 2018. Female is a dummy equal to one if the child is female, zero otherwise. Parent is mother is a dummy equal to one
if the interviewee is the child’s biological mother, zero otherwise (remaining cases are all biological fathers). Migration
background is a dummy equal to one if the parent was not born in Germany, zero otherwise. Parent currently working is
a dummy equal to one if the parent was working at baseline (part-time or full-time), zero otherwise. Household income
is the monthly equivalent household income in EUR. No school degree, Lower secondary degree, Middle secondary
degree (“MSA”), and College entrance qualification (“Abitur”) are all dummy variables indicating the parent’s highest
school degree.
Selection into Sample. The fact that we obtained birth registry data for the entire cohort
gives us the rare opportunity to examine selection into our analytical sample. Appendix
Table B1 depicts the characteristics of families who participated in the study (Column (1))
and those who did not (Column (2)), as well as the difference between the two groups
(Column (3)) and the p-values from a t-test of equality of the group means (Column (4)).
The samples do not differ in terms of detailed area of residence (zip-code level) or in
whether the child lives with both parents. In line with our sampling strategy, the share
of first-time mothers and first-time fathers in our sample is higher than in the rest of the
birth cohort, and the number of siblings and the average age of parents are lower (age
differences are significant only for mothers). We succeeded in recruiting a large share
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(41%) of children with migration background.20 Migration background is still higher
among non-participants (51%), and the share of children with German citizenship is
slightly lower (79% vs. 83%). In sum, our sample represents the characteristics of the
full birth cohort well, with a slight over-representation of first-time parents (which was
intended) and of non-migrant families.21
Lower- and Higher-SES Families. As specified in our pre-analysis plan, our study sets
a particular focus on differences by SES. Following previous literature on educational
inequality (e.g., Bjoerklund and Salvanes, 2011; Jessen et al., 2020), we categorize families’
SES based on parental education. Specifically, those 57.7% of responding parents (n =
350) who have a college entrance qualification (“Abitur”) are classified as higher-SES,
whereas the 42.3% of parents without a college entrance qualification (n = 257) are
classified as lower-SES (see Table 1).22 The proportion of lower-SES families in our
sample reflects the German-wide share well: For example, in the representative German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 47% of mothers with children aged 0–1 years are lower-
SES according to our classification (Goebel et al., 2019; SOEP, 2019). Similarly, in the
German Child Care Study, which is an annual representative survey of households with
children under the age of three years, 48% of children are from a lower-SES household
(Jessen et al., 2020). Furthermore, our results are confirmed by alternative classifications
of families’ SES based on both parents’ education, household income, and single-parent
status (see Section 4.4).
Using baseline data on application knowledge and parent–child activities, we can study
differences between lower- and higher-SES families. The results underscore the suitability
of our SES classification: on average, lower-SES parents give 0.6 fewer correct answers
20Note that in the registry data on the entire birth cohort, we have information on migration background
for the child, but not for the parents (the latter information is only available for families who participated
in our study). Similarly, the registry data do not contain information on education or income.
21We also check whether the observed differences between our baseline sample and the full birth cohort
affect our results. We apply propensity score weights reflecting the probability of participating in our
study. The re-weighted treatment effect estimates are very similar to those in the unweighted regression,
suggesting that selective participation in our study does not bias our results (see Appendix B and Table
B2 for details).
22Information on parental education is missing for six parents. To avoid losing these observations in
our analysis, we impute missing information in five cases using information on the partner’s education
level, which was elicited in the post-treatment survey. This imputation is based on the idea of educational
assortative mating in Germany (Eika et al., 2019). For the remaining case, we assume that the respective
parent has a college entrance qualification, as this degree represents the modal education level in our data.
Our results are robust to dropping observations with missing education information and to applying
alternative imputation schemes that classify all missing cases as lower-SES or as higher-SES (results
available upon request).
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to our application knowledge questions (see Appendix Table A1), which is consistent
with SES gaps in knowledge documented in the existing literature (Bleemer and Zafar,
2018). Moreover, children from lower-SES families are 7–12 pp less likely to regularly
look at picture books, read stories, or sing songs, whereas they are 21 pp more likely
to frequently watch TV or videos (see Appendix Table A2). These results suggest that
lower-SES children are exposed to less stimulating home environments, and thus attending
child care may yield a relatively larger increase in care quality for them (Cascio, 2015).
3.3. Treatment
The treatment was designed to address potential behavioral barriers in the child care
application process (discussed in Section 2.3). It includes two components: information
provision and customized application assistance.23
To address parental knowledge gaps about the child care application process, each
parent in the treatment group was shown a four-minute information video on the inter-
viewers’ tablet computer, immediately after the baseline survey. The video informed that
(i) all parents in Germany have a legal entitlement to a child care slot after the child’s
first birthday, (ii) child care in Rhineland-Palatinate is free for all children aged two years
and older, with fee reductions (e.g., for lower-income families) available for children below
the age of two years, and (iii) applying early and to more than one child care center
increases the chance of getting a slot. The goal of our treatment was to mitigate bar-
riers when searching for a child care slot, not to persuade parents to enroll their child
into early child care. To respect parents’ preferences, the video emphasized that (center-
based) child care is only one out of several care arrangements, and it is the parents’
decision alone which one to choose.24 Appendix F.2 shows screenshots of the video and
the transcript translated from German to English. Treated parents also received a link
and password to a non-googleable website where they could look at the information from
the video again. Interviewers did not know the treatment status of the parents they were
interviewing during the baseline survey. Only after parents had completed the survey,
interviewers were informed by an on-screen message whether the video would be shown.
We recruited new interviewers for the post-treatment survey, and the post-treatment sur-
vey was identical in treatment and control group. Thus, interviewers in the baseline and
post-treatment surveys were blind to the treatment assignment, which eliminates concerns
that treatment-specific interviewer effects bias our results.
23Based on an ex-ante power analysis, we decided to combine both components into one treatment.
24In Section 4.4, we show that indeed the treatment does not affect parents’ child care preferences.
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Parents in the treatment group were also offered customized application assistance.
We hired six student assistants and gave them intensive training on how to help parents
achieve their preferred child care arrangement. The assistants’ task was to provide tailored
support to address the specific issues faced by each family. For instance, services included
scrutinizing possible options on how to organize child care, gathering information about
application procedures, helping with paperwork and filing applications, and reminding
parents of important dates, such as open houses at child care centers or application
deadlines. At the same time, assistants were instructed not to provide child care services
themselves or to assist parents with tasks unrelated to child care, such as job applications.
Moreover, assistants were instructed not to persuade parents of a particular child care
arrangement. Assistants received a detailed manual that described the activities they
were supposed to perform for the parents and what activities were outside the scope of
their assistance duties.
Assistants contacted treated parents in the days following the baseline survey to in-
quire about demand for their services. Thus, customized application assistance was im-
plemented as an opt-in design, giving parents the opportunity to freely choose whether to
use the assistance. One-third (33%) of families in the treatment group took up the offer
of assistance, with no difference in take-up rates between lower- and higher-SES families
(32% vs. 33%). Although we observe several qualitative differences between assistance
takers and non-takers, only lower application knowledge is statistically significant in pre-
dicting higher assistance take-up.25 Our treatment involved a relatively modest effort
for the assistants. The median number of contacts between assistants and parents (i.e.,
in-person meetings, phone calls, or emails) was four, and the median time an assistant
invested per family was 1.5 hours (mean: 2 hours).
3.4. Randomization and Balancing
We used stratified randomization to assign each family in the sample frame to ei-
ther the control or treatment group (Athey and Imbens, 2017). Using the birth registry
data, we defined strata based on the following characteristics: city of residence (two cat-
egories), child’s birth quarter (four categories), whether the child lives with both parents
(two categories), and first-time parent status (two categories).26 Within these strata,
we randomized families between both experimental conditions with 50% probability. In
25In addition, assistance takers tend to have higher beliefs about returns to child care and lower income
than non-takers. Moreover, they tend to be more often female and with a migration background.
26 In the birth registry data, we observe whether the mother or father has other children up to six
years of age and interpret this as a proxy for first-time parent status.
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the analytical sample, the control group comprises 287 families (47%) and the treatment
group 320 families (53%). The share of lower-SES families is similar in both groups (44%
in the control group and 41% in the treatment group).
Table 1 shows that the randomization successfully balanced observable characteristics
between the control and treatment group (see Columns (2)–(5)). Among the 14 pairwise
comparisons of pre-treatment outcomes, child characteristics, and parent characteristics,
none is statistically significant at the 10% level. Because our analysis places a particular
focus on treatment effects by families’ SES, we also test for balancing within the groups
of lower- and higher-SES families. To do so, we regress each variable in Table 1 on the
treatment indicator, a higher-SES dummy, and their interaction. Column (6) reports the
p-values of F-tests for joint significance of the coefficients on the treatment indicator and
the interaction term. Because we categorize families’ SES based on parental education, we
do not include parental education variables in this balancing test. Reassuringly, none of
the F-tests is significant, implying that the randomization procedure achieved balancing
within both SES groups as well.
The balancing tests in Table 1 are based on all families who participated in the baseline
survey, but baseline characteristics are also well-balanced among those participating in
the post-treatment survey (see Appendix Table E5).
3.5. Empirical Strategy
We estimate the intention-to-treat effects of our intervention by ordinary least squares
(OLS) using the following regression model:
Yi = α+β1Treatmenti +β2Treatmenti ×HigherSESi +β3HigherSESi + X′iδ+ εi (1)
Yi is the outcome variable of interest for family i. As our main outcomes, we focus on
binary indicators of child care application and actual enrollment which we measured in
the post-treatment survey. The application dummy takes a value of one if family i has
applied for a child care slot, zero otherwise. The enrollment dummy takes a value of one
if family i’s child attends child care or if the family secured a child care slot for the future,
zero otherwise.27 The variable Treatmenti is the treatment indicator. HigherSESi is
27We took great care to ensure that parents’ self-reported outcomes are as reliable as possible. For
example, we also ask the parents to provide the name(s) of the child care center(s) they have applied
to or have enrolled their child in. Therefore, parents could not easily misreport our main outcomes of
interest, and almost all parents do provide the name(s) of specific child care center(s). Moreover, there
is no differential (mis)reporting by treatment status, as the share of parents who name specific child care
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an indicator for higher-SES families (from the baseline survey), which takes a value of
one if the respondent has obtained a college entrance qualification (“higher-SES”), and
zero otherwise (“lower-SES”) (also see Section 3.2). The intention-to-treat effect of the
treatment for lower-SES participants is given by β1. The coefficient β2 indicates how the
treatment effect differs between higher- and lower-SES participants, whereas the treatment
effect on higher-SES families is given by β1 + β2.28
As outlined in our pre-analysis plan, we include a vector of control variables obtained
from the baseline survey, Xi, in order to increase the precision of our treatment effect esti-
mates. The control variables include strata fixed effects, baseline values of the respective
outcome (if available)29, child age and gender, age, gender, and migration background
of the responding parent, baseline values of parental employment status, log equivalent
household income, as well as zip-code and survey date fixed effects.30 In the few cases in
which control variables have missing values, we impute missings with the sample mean,
and add imputation dummies to the regressions.
Finally, εi denotes the error term. Inference is based on robust standard errors. The
results also hold when using randomization inference, which randomly reassigns treatment
status within strata, and when correcting for multiple hypothesis testing (see Section 4.4).
4. Results
This section presents the experimental results. We begin by estimating the effects of
our treatment on the probability of applying for child care and enrollment in child care
(Section 4.1). Then, we examine heterogeneity in treatment effects across subgroups (Sec-
tion 4.2), present a mechanism analysis (Section 4.3), and conduct a series of robustness
tests (Section 4.4).
center(s) is very similar in treatment and control group. Finally, our results are robust when we consider
parents as having applied or having their child enrolled only if they name a specific child care center (see
Appendix Table E3).
28Note that we refrain from running instrumental variable models to estimate treatment effects on the
treated (TOT) for families who take up the assistance because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to
hold in our setting (as we cannot rule out that the information we provide in the video directly affects
outcomes).
29Since we did not elicit application rates in the baseline survey to conceal the aim of our study, we
use baseline enrollment as the pre-treatment outcome for application. The results are almost identical
without this control.
30Survey date fixed effects refer to the post-treatment survey. We include them because the data collec-
tion phase was relatively long (about two months), and timing is important in the child care application
process (e.g., because some child care centers may allocate slots based on the application date or have
certain deadlines after which they allocate available slots). Treatment effects are robust to excluding
survey date fixed effects.
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Notes: Figure shows intention-to-treat effects for the subgroups of lower- and higher-SES families, based
on OLS models shown in Table 2. The left-hand panel depicts treatment effects on the share of parents
who applied for a child care slot; the right-hand panel shows treatment effects on the share of parents who
enrolled their child in child care. Outcomes are collected in the post-treatment survey nine months after
the treatment. To benchmark the size of treatment effects, we also plot the raw SES gap in the control
group (i.e., the difference in the shares of lower- vs. higher-SES parents who applied for or enrolled their
child in child care). For both outcomes, the treatment effects for lower-SES families are significantly
larger than for higher-SES families (p = .013 for applied and p = .046 for enrolled, see Columns (2)
and (4) of Table 2). Error bars show robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05,
*** p< .01
4.1. Main Results
Figure 2 presents our main results. The left panel of the figure is based on Column (2)
of Table 2 and depicts treatment effects on the probability of applying for a child care
slot, separately for lower- and higher-SES families. For lower-SES families, the treatment
increases application rates by 21 pp (blue bar). The treatment does not affect higher-SES
families’ application rates (green bar). Thus, the intervention almost entirely closes the
control-group SES gap in application rates of 22 pp (grey bar; see the bottom part of
Table 2 for details).
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Table 2: Treatment Effects on Child Care Application and Enroll-
ment
Nine Months After Treatment
Applied Applied Enrolled Enrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.078** 0.213*** 0.051 0.159**
(0.038) (0.072) (0.044) (0.062)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.214** -0.171**
(0.086) (0.085)
Higher-SES 0.069 0.179*** 0.133*** 0.221***
(0.045) (0.066) (0.048) (0.064)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.000 -0.011
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.060)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.497
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.216
Control Group SES Gap 0.218 0.280
N 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on child care application and en-
rollment, all models are estimated by OLS. Outcomes are measured in the post-
treatment survey nine months after the treatment. In Columns (1) and (2), the
outcome variable takes a value of one if respondents state that they have applied
for child care and zero otherwise; in Columns (3) and (4), the outcome variable
takes a value of one if respondents state that their child is enrolled in child care
and zero otherwise. Further controls include baseline outcome value, survey date
fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for de-
tails). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are included.
Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome
in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES)
parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference between control means
of higher- and lower-SES parents. We additionally report p-values based on ran-
domization inference and correcting for multiple hypothesis testing in Panel A of
Appendix Table E1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
* p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
The right panel of Figure 2, which is based on Column (4) of Table 2, shows treatment
effects on actual child care enrollment. The treatment increases enrollment rates for lower-
SES families by 16 pp (blue bar), and again does not affect higher-SES families (green
bar). In consequence, our intervention closes more than half of the control-group SES gap
in enrollment rates of 28 pp (grey bar).31 We discuss potential reasons why the treatment
31We also estimate the treatment effect on the average weekly hours that children spend in child care
(with hours of non-enrolled children counted as zero). We find that the treatment increases child care
attendance of lower-SES children by 4.4 hours, closing more than half of the control-group SES gap of
7.6 hours (see Appendix Table C1). This treatment effect is completely driven by families enrolling their
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entirely closes the SES gap in child care application but only partially closes the SES gap
in enrollment in Section 5.
While we pre-specified to focus our analysis on separate treatment effects by families’
SES, Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 also present average treatment effects in the full
sample. Naturally, average treatment effects on child care application (8 pp; p = .041)
and enrollment (5 pp; p = .249) are between the separate effects for lower- and higher-SES
families. However, these average effects conceal the high effectiveness of our intervention
for lower-SES families.
4.2. Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects
Next, we investigate potential treatment effect heterogeneities for lower-SES families
along baseline family characteristics that might moderate the effects of our intervention:
child age, migration background, baseline knowledge about child care, beliefs about the
degree to which child care promotes child development, and local competition for child
care slots. For each of these characteristics, we add a triple interaction between treat-
ment, SES, and an indicator for the respective subsample (using median splits when
possible) to Equation (1). We present the heterogeneity results for lower-SES families in
Figure 3, whereas the full estimation results are presented in Appendix Table C2. For
all considered dimensions of heterogeneity, we find that treatment effects on enrollment
tend to be considerably larger for those lower-SES families who are likely to benefit more
from alleviating behavioral barriers. While treatment effects for lower-SES families in the
other subsamples remain positive, they are rather modest in size, and none of them is
statistically significant.
As parental demand for an early child care slot increases sharply with child age (Jessen
et al., 2020), our treatment is likely to be more relevant for parents of relatively older
children. Splitting the sample by median age, we find that the treatment effect for lower-
SES children of above-median age (on average, 20 months in post-treatment survey) is
21.9 pp (p = .027, see Panel A of Figure 3). The heterogeneity by child age might be
particularly pronounced in our study setting, as child care in Rhineland-Palatinate is free
of charge for children aged two years and older (see Section 2.2).
Families who are less familiar with the child care market may benefit more from
the support our intervention provides. One such group may be families with migration
child in child care (extensive margin) instead of enrolled families extending the number of child care hours
(intensive margin).
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Notes: Figure shows heterogeneous treatment effects (ITT) on child care enrollment for different
subgroups within the lower-SES sample, based on OLS models using triple interactions (see Ap-
pendix Table C2 for details). Within each panel, the left-hand bar shows the estimated treatment
effect for the subgroup of lower-SES families to which the respective heterogeneity applies (e.g., those
with children with above-median age in Panel A); the right-hand bar shows the treatment effect
for the remaining lower-SES families (e.g., those with children with below-median age in Panel A).
Outcomes are collected in the post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment. We addition-
ally report p-values based on randomization inference and correcting for multiple hypothesis testing
in Panel B of Appendix Table E1. Error bars show robust standard errors. Significance levels:
* p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
background, for example, due to potential language barriers or lower social capital.32
Measuring migration background by whether the interviewed parent was born in Germany
or elsewhere, we find a substantial treatment effect of 27.8 pp for lower-SES migrant
families (p = .006, see Panel B of Figure 3). As a more direct proxy for familiarity with
the child care market, Panel C splits the sample along baseline application knowledge. The
treatment significantly increases enrollment by 21.3 pp for lower-SES families with below-
median knowledge (p = .010). Overall, these heterogeneities suggest that the treatment
may be compensating for a lack of familiarity with the child care market.
The treatment may also be more effective for parents who believe that child care
yields high returns for their child with respect to the cognitive and social development.
To analyze heterogeneities by parental beliefs about the returns to child care attendance
32In Germany, enrollment rates for families with migration background are 12 pp lower than for native
families, despite very similar demand for child care (see Figure 2 in Jessen et al., 2020).
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(measured at baseline), we use parents’ agreement with the following statement (elicited
on a 7-point Likert scale): “Children who have attended child care are better developed
at school entry than children who have not.” Panel D of Figure 3 shows a treatment effect
of 22.0 pp on enrollment rates for lower-SES parents with above-median return beliefs to
child care attendance (p = .009). These results are in line with the literature highlighting
the importance of parental beliefs about the technology of skill formation in explaining
variation in early child care investment (e.g., Cunha et al., 2020).
In addition to parental characteristics, the effectiveness of our intervention may also
depend on local child care market conditions. In particular, we expect treatment effects
to be larger in areas with greater competition for child care slots, because shortcomings
in child care applications (e.g., lacking relevant information or missing deadlines/visiting
days) may be particularly costly in these tight markets. To calculate a proxy for com-
petition for slots, we use detailed spatial information on the location of the child care
centers and the entire cohort of families with children aged 0–1 years at baseline (i.e.,
our sample families and their potential “competitors”). We divide the number of child
care centers within a one-mile (1.6 km) radius of each family’s home by the number of
children aged 0–1 years at baseline living in that area. On average, there are 6.4 child
care centers per 100 children (median: 6.5), and the 10–90 percentile range is 2.6–9.8. We
define areas with “high” competition as those with a within-city below-median number
of child care centers per 100 children. The treatment effect on enrollment for lower-SES
families living in highly competitive areas is 27.8 pp (p = .005, see Panel E of Figure 3).
Thus, addressing barriers in the child care application process is particularly helpful when
it is difficult for (lower-SES) families to acquire a slot as a result of strong competition.
Our heterogeneity analysis reveals several plausible moderators of the treatment ef-
fects on enrollment, which may be important for designing policies to improve equity in
child care admissions. Despite large heterogeneities across different subgroups, sample
sizes and statistical power for subgroup analyses are limited, so these results should be
interpreted with some caution. In fact, despite the large economic differences in treatment
effects across the considered subgroups of lower-SES families, the difference is statistically
significant at conventional levels only for child care competition (p = .094; see Column (5)
of Appendix Table C2).
4.3. Mechanisms Analysis
In this section, we examine possible mechanisms through which the treatment affects
child care enrollment. First, we analyze treatment effects on pre-specified intermediate
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Table 3: Treatment Effects on Application Knowledge and Behavior
Application Knowl. Application Behavior
Index Visited Called Emailed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.299** 0.259*** 0.086 -0.079
(0.151) (0.078) (0.077) (0.058)
Treatment × Higher-SES 0.103 -0.272*** -0.083 0.146**
(0.190) (0.095) (0.094) (0.072)
Higher-SES 0.064 0.190** 0.170** -0.051
(0.135) (0.074) (0.070) (0.057)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect 0.402*** -0.013 0.002 0.068
Higher-SES (0.115) (0.055) (0.058) (0.044)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.143 0.731 0.397 0.116
Control Mean Lower-SES -0.217 0.495 0.258 0.208
Control Mean SES Gap 0.361 0.236 0.140 -0.092
N 519 515 516 515
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on application behavior, all models are estimated
by OLS. Outcomes are measured in the post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment.
In Column (1), the outcome is an index that combines answers to all six application knowledge
questions to an average of z-scores (standardized to mean = 0 and SD = 1 in the control group,
Kling et al., 2007). In Column (2), the outcome is a dummy equal to one if parents visited a child
care center on-site during the application process, zero otherwise. We also report results for
dummy variables equal to one if parents called a child care center (Column (3)) or contacted a
child care center by email (Column (4)) during the application process (zero otherwise). Further
controls include baseline outcome value for Application knowledge (in Column (1)), survey date
fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation
dummies for missing values in control variables are included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-
SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey
for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference between
control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. We additionally report p-values based on
randomization inference and correcting for multiple hypothesis testing in Panel C of Appendix
Table E1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05,
*** p< .01.
outcomes. We primarily consider application knowledge and application behavior as po-
tential mediators, as these dimensions are addressed by our intervention and are likely to
be important for securing a child care slot. Second, we follow the approach developed by
Heckman et al. (2013) to decompose the overall treatment effect into shares attributed to
these different mediators.
Application Knowledge. A key component of our intervention is reducing potential knowl-
edge barriers to child care usage by providing relevant information about the child care
application process. Using a standardized index of application knowledge in the post-
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treatment survey as an outcome, we do indeed find strong positive treatment effects on
parental knowledge (see Column (1) of Table 3). For lower-SES parents, the treatment
increases the application knowledge index by 30% of a standard deviation. However, the
treatment effect for higher-SES parents is even (albeit non-significantly) larger at 40%
of a standard deviation, which suggests that treatment-induced knowledge improvements
are unlikely to be the main reason why the intervention mitigates the SES gap in child
care enrollment.33
Application Behavior. Since the treatment involves information about application strate-
gies and customized application assistance, altered application behavior is another possible
mechanism underlying the treatment effect on child care enrollment. Aside from the large
treatment effect on application rates (see Section 4.1), we focus here on actions during
the application process that are generally not mandatory, but may still be beneficial for
obtaining a child care slot: on-site visits to child care centers (e.g., at open houses), as well
as phone calls and emails sent to child care centers. We hypothesize that on-site visits,
in particular, are important for obtaining a slot, which is based on anecdotal evidence
and on corroborating results from our survey with 440 child care center managers across
Germany.34 Column (2) of Table 3 shows that the treatment significantly increases the
probability for lower-SES families to visit child care centers on-site during the application
process by 26 pp. The treatment does not affect the probability of visits from higher-SES
families, implying that it closes the substantial control-group SES gap in on-site visits
of about 24 pp. By contrast, the intervention has no effect on calling or emailing child
care centers, suggesting that these actions do not constitute channels through which the
treatment affects child care enrollment.
An alternative to estimating treatment effects on binary indicators of child care appli-
cation and application behavior is to use the numbers of applications, visits, phone calls,
and emails as outcome variables. Consistent with our findings for the binary outcomes,
33Appendix Table C3 shows that results hold when using alternative methods for calculating the
knowledge index, that is, an index based on factor analysis allowing for unequal weighting of the six
knowledge questions (Column (2)) and the simple sum of correct answers (Column (3)). Examining the
effects on each knowledge question separately in Columns (4)–(9) reveals that the treatment primarily
improves knowledge about the age for the legal entitlement and child care costs.
34In the survey, 74% of child care center managers state that visits are “very” or “somewhat” important
for obtaining a child care slot in their facility. The respective figures for phone calls and emails are 48%
and 38%; see Appendix E.4 for details about the survey. Comparing the frequency of use of these
communication channels in the control group of our experimental sample (Columns (2)–(4) of Table 3),
we observe that, on average, lower-SES parents are less likely than higher-SES parents to visit a child
care center on-site but are more likely to send emails to child care centers).
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Appendix Table C4 shows that the treatment increases the number of applications and
on-site visits for lower-SES families. This is also in line with the fact that our treatment
explicitly encouraged parents to apply to more than one child care center (see Section
3.3).35
Parental Preferences. The goal of our treatment was to address the potential behavioral
barriers that lower-SES families might face when trying to obtain a child care slot, but
not to persuade parents to adopt a particular child care arrangement (see Section 3.3
for details). Influencing parental preferences would not only be critical because it would
complicate the (normative) interpretation of our results, but would also be ethically ques-
tionable. Reassuringly, Appendix Table C5 shows that the treatment does not affect
parents’ plans for when to enroll their child in child care (Columns (1) and (2)), or their
stated willingness to pay for a child care slot (Column (3)). These findings imply that
changes in parental preferences do not operate as a channel through which the treatment
effect on enrollment materializes.
Mediation Analysis. Based on these results for intermediate outcomes, we conduct a me-
diation analysis to study the channels through which the treatment affects child care
enrollment for lower-SES families. Following the approach by Heckman et al. (2013) and
Heckman and Pinto (2015) (applied, for instance, by Oreopoulos et al., 2017; Kosse et al.,
2020; Resnjanskij et al., 2021), we decompose the treatment effect into a share explained
by k observed mediator variables, and a remaining share explained by unobserved media-
tor variables. Assuming that the outcome is a linear function of our observed k mediators
(Mki ) and a vector of sociodemographic controls (X ′i), we extend our estimation Equation
(1) to:







λkMki ×HigherSESi + X′iδ + µi (2)
Because we find strong heterogeneity in treatment effects by SES, we also allow effects
of mediators to differ by SES (θk for lower-SES families and θk+λk for higher-SES fami-
35Note, however, that these count variables are prone to dynamic selection bias, as families are likely
to stop sending applications and contacting child care centers once they have obtained a slot (see, e.g.,
Marinescu and Skandalis, 2021, for a discussion of dynamic selection in the context of job search behavior).
Therefore, these results need to be interpreted with some caution.
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lies).36 Furthermore, we make the assumption required for such mediation analyses that
any unobserved mediator (included in the error term µi) that is affected by the treatment
is orthogonal to the observed mediators.37 Then, βresidual1 indicates the treatment effect
on lower-SES families net of the observed mediators, and the share of the treatment effect
explained by all observed mediators is 1 − βresidual1 /β1 (with β1 from Equation (1)).
The following intermediate outcomes are significantly affected by the treatment and
are thus considered as mediators of the treatment effect on child care enrollment for lower-
SES families: (i) whether a family has applied for a child care slot, (ii) the application
knowledge index, and (iii) whether a family has visited child care centers on-site during
the application process. Appendix Table D1 shows the results from estimating Equation
(2) with the three mediators. In addition, to assess the relative contribution of mediator
Mki , we use the estimate of the treatment effect on the respective mediator (see Column
(2) of Table 2 and Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3):
Mki = γk0 +γk1Treatmenti+γk2Treatmenti×HigherSESi+γk3HigherSESi+X′iγk4 +ηki (3)
The share of the treatment effect for lower-SES families attributed to mediatorMk can
be expressed as mk = θkγk1/β1, with θk estimated from Equation (2), γk1 from Equation
(3), and β1 from Equation (1).
Figure 4 depicts the results of our mediation analysis for lower-SES families. Con-
sidering each mediator separately in the upper three bars, we find that changes in the
probability to apply for child care and in having visited child care centers on-site both
account for more than 40% of the overall treatment effect on child care enrollment. By
contrast, increased application knowledge only explains 13% of the estimated treatment
effect. Accounting for all three mediators jointly in the bottom bar of Figure 4, we can
36Decomposing the outcome variable as in Equation (2) assumes that the θks do not differ between
treatment and control group. For example, this means that, conditional on our other mediators and
control variables, applications are equally effective for child care enrollment in both treatment and control
group. We can test this assumption by interacting the mediators with the treatment dummy and adding
them to the model in Equation (2) (see, for instance, Oreopoulos et al., 2017). Likewise, the decomposition
assumes that the effect of the control variables in X′i on child care enrollment does not differ by treatment
status. We again test this assumption by interacting control variables with the treatment dummy and
adding them to the model estimated in Equation (2). Reassuringly, in both models none of the interaction
terms is statistically significant at conventional levels (all p > .10). Thus, both assumptions cannot be
rejected in our data.
37Note that a violation of this arguably strong assumption, such that unobserved mediators are posi-
tively related to both observed mediators and outcomes, would upward bias the estimated share of the
treatment effect explained by our mediators in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Share of Lower-SES Treatment Effect on Enrollment Attributed to Mediators
0.41 0.59
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Channel 1: Applied for Child Care
0.13 0.87
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Channel 2: Inreased Application Knowledge
0.43 0.57
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Channel 3: Visited Child Care Center
0.37 0.01 0.12 0.50
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
All Three Channels Jointly
Applied for Child Care Increased Appl. Knowledge Visited Child Care Center Unobserved Factors
Notes: Figure shows the share of the treatment effect on child care enrollment for lower-SES parents
that can be attributed to the respective mediator. The upper three bars show the contribution of a
single mediator, while the bottom bar shows the contribution of all three mediators when they are
jointly included. Detailed results are reported in Appendix Table D1.
explain more than half of the treatment effect on enrollment. The largest share of 37%
is attributed to having applied for child care, and another 12% to on-site visits to child
care centers. However, increased application knowledge explains only a negligible share
of the treatment effect (<1%), once we include the other two mediators. The idea that
application knowledge is unlikely to be a main driver of the treatment effect on enrollment
is in line with our result that the treatment — despite substantially increasing higher-
SES parents’ application knowledge — does not affect child care enrollment of higher-SES
families.
In sum, our mechanism analysis provides the intuitive result that the main channel
through which the treatment affects child care enrollment of lower-SES families is the
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increased likelihood that these families apply for a slot. Moreover, the treatment effect on
enrollment also materializes through increased on-site visits to child care centers during
the application process, improving the chances of obtaining a slot conditional on having
applied. By contrast, increased application knowledge explains only little of the overall
treatment effect on enrollment, which suggests that customized application assistance is
a particularly important component of our intervention.38 Note, however, that the results
of our mediation analysis do not necessarily rule out that knowledge about the child care
application process matters in our setting. First, it may be that the treatment affects
relevant knowledge components that are not captured by our six application knowledge
questions, such as specific information provided by the assistant. Second, it could be that
changing application knowledge affects enrollment rates by altering application behavior,
thus attributing the knowledge effect to the other mediators.
4.4. Robustness
Multiple Hypothesis Testing and Randomization Inference. Because we use multiple out-
comes and test for several heterogeneous treatment effects (see Figure 3), we have to
adjust for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT). We run three different versions of MHT
corrections, namely those suggested by List et al. (2019), Westfall and Young (1993), and
Romano and Wolf (2005, 2016). As an additional robustness check, we conduct random-
ization inference (cf. Young, 2019) which, in essence, randomly reassigns the treatment
status within strata and tests the “true” treatment effect against the distribution of ran-
domly reassigned treatment effects. Results and details of the methodology are presented
in Appendix Table E1. All treatment effects for lower-SES families remain significant
at the 5%-level or better when applying MHT corrections and randomization inference,
respectively.39
Alternative Definitions of Lower-SES Background. Our classification of families’ SES
based on parental education follows a standard approach in the literature on educa-
tional inequality (e.g., Bjoerklund and Salvanes, 2011; Jessen et al., 2020). Below, we
test the robustness of our findings when applying alternative definitions of “lower-SES”.
Our main definition of lower-SES families used throughout the paper is families in which
38Consistent with this result, Bettinger et al. (2012) find that providing information about the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) without complementary help to complete the application
is ineffective in increasing college enrollment rates and other outcomes.
39The only exception is the treatment effect on application knowledge, which is significant only at the
15%-level when correcting for MHT (p = .134, p = .112, p = .113, respectively). However, randomization
inference still yields a statistically significant treatment effect on application knowledge (p = .051).
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the responding parent does not have a college entrance qualification (SES-1, 42% of the
sample). We provide results for three alternative definitions: i) neither of the two par-
ents has a college entrance qualification (SES-2, 30% of the sample), ii) either SES-2 or
equivalent household income is below the poverty line (SES-3, 45% of the sample, based
on Falk et al. (2021)), and iii) either SES-3 or single-parent status (SES-4, 46% of the
sample, following Kosse et al. (2020)). Appendix Table E2 presents our main results when
applying these different SES definitions. We find that the treatment effects for lower-SES
families remain statistically significant for all SES definitions. While the application ef-
fects of our treatment decrease somewhat when expanding the group of lower-SES families
(for definitions SES-3 and SES-4), enrollment effects remain very similar across the alter-
native SES definitions and are always significant at the 1%-level. Overall, this exercise
demonstrates that the documented treatment effects on lower-SES families are not driven
by any particular definition of lower-SES background.
Attrition. A detailed attrition analysis in Appendix E.1 shows that the probability of
participating in the post-treatment survey is independent of treatment status and is not
selective with respect to baseline outcomes in the full sample or in the subsamples of lower-
and higher-SES families. Moreover, observable characteristics remain well-balanced across
treatment and control group among those parents who participated in the post-treatment
survey. We also show the robustness of our results to re-weighting the observed data using
inverse probabilities of participation in the post-treatment survey and to the bounding
approach suggested by Lee (2009). Hence, attrition is unlikely to bias our treatment effect
estimates.
External Validity. Next, we assess the external validity of our results. In Section 3.2, we
showed that our findings are generalizable to the full cohort of families in the two cities
from which we recruited our sample. However, the families in our sample may not be
representative of an average family in Germany because we conducted the study only in
two cities located in the same federal state. While the sociodemographic characteristics
of the population in the two sample cities are quite similar to the Germany-wide average
(see Section 2.2), this does not necessarily hold for families with young children, which are
in the focus of our study. Thus, we use data from a representative sample of families in
Germany to construct weights based on migration background, SES, equivalent household
income, and current employment status. The re-weighted treatment effect estimates are
very similar to the unweighted results, speaking in favor of the external validity of our
results for families with young children in Germany overall (see Appendix E.2 for details).
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However, we refrain from making stronger claims about the generalizability of our results
because the lack of official statistics makes it impossible to judge the representativeness
of our sample with respect to other important characteristics relevant in the child care
application process, such as parental application knowledge, degree of rationing of child
care slots, and specific processes for how slots are allocated.
Displacement Effects. In a rationed child care market (see Section 2) with a fixed number
of available child care slots, a positive treatment effect for lower-SES families on child
care enrollment could potentially imply that enrollment chances of other families (treated
higher-SES families, control group families, or out-of-sample families) suffer (i.e., that
they are “displaced” by treated lower-SES families). Because our data include the exact
home locations of the entire birth cohort from which we recruited our sample, we are
able to analyze whether such displacement effects matter in our setting. We test for
displacement effects as follows. First, for each household in our sample, we compute the
share of households in the full cohort within a one-mile (1.6 km) radius that (i) participates
in our study and (ii) is randomly assigned to the treatment group. Across households that
participate in our study, the share of other households participating within a 1-mile radius
varies between 0 and 34% (mean: 23%), and the share of treated households varies between
0 and 19% (mean: 13%). In a second step, we regress whether a child in the control group
is enrolled in child care on the share of households in the treatment group, controlling
for the share of households participating in the study. The existence of displacement
effects would imply that the likelihood that control-group children are enrolled in child
care decreases in the share of treated households in the control-group family’s surrounding
area. However, the results in Appendix Table E10 provide no evidence for displacement
effects of our treatment, as the likelihood that a control-group family’s child is enrolled in
child care is unrelated to the share of treated households in the family’s vicinity. The same
is true when we conduct the displacement analysis separately for lower- and higher-SES
families in the control group.40
While it is reassuring that the chance of enrolling in child care for the control group
is not systematically related to the share of treated households nearby, it is not immedi-
ately clear how treated families in a rationed market were able to secure child care slots
without negatively affecting other families. A potential channel is that inefficiencies in
slot allocation in the German child care market (see Section 2) lead to slots being un-
40These results also imply that the estimated treatment effect is not exaggerated owing to the control
group facing a lower chance of child care enrollment because of the treatment.
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filled, for example, temporarily unused slots or slots that are not assigned to parents right
away. Because there are no official statistics reporting the current number of unfilled
child care slots in Germany, we conducted a nationwide survey among child care center
managers (n = 440) to learn about the extent of potential inefficiencies in slot allocation
(see Appendix E.4). Child care center managers report a substantial number of unfilled
slots for children below the age of three: On average, there was at least one unfilled slot
in more than half of the child care centers (58%), and about one-third of centers (37%)
reported more than five unfilled child care slots. In fact, these figures are even larger
for the specific region in which we conducted our study; however, owing to the limited
sample size, we report only the more conservative Germany-wide numbers. Our findings
from the child care center manager survey imply that inefficiencies exist in the allocation
of child care slots, leaving room for an increased number of slots to be allocated to the
treatment group without impeding the control group (or out-of-sample families). For ex-
ample, treated lower-SES families being more likely to visit child care centers on-site and
sending more applications might be channels that help them to find (temporarily) unfilled
slots.
5. Conclusion
We conducted a randomized controlled trial to study whether reducing behavioral
barriers in the application process increases the use of early child care, particularly for
disadvantaged families. Our intervention was designed to address behavioral barriers by
randomly providing child-care-related information and offering customized application
assistance. For lower-SES families, the treatment increases the probability of applying for
a child care slot by 21 pp and of eventually enrolling their children in child care by 16 pp.
Higher-SES families do not react to the treatment. Thus, alleviating behavioral barriers
substantially reduces the large socioeconomic gap in child care enrollment in the control
group.
Of course, behavioral barriers in the application process are only one of several expla-
nations for the large observed SES gap in child care usage. We observe that the estimated
treatment effect on lower-SES families’ application rates does not fully translate into
higher enrollment rates, suggesting that additional factors not addressed by our interven-
tion prevent lower-SES families from child care usage, even conditional on having applied
for a slot. These factors may include complementary demand-side reasons, such as SES
differences in the quality of applications or general application strategies (e.g., narrow vs.
wide scope of search), as well as supply-side reasons, such as discrimination against lower-
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SES families by child care providers in their admission decisions. We consider studying
such additional factors an important component for future research.
From a policy perspective, our findings have implications for the design of equity-
oriented social programs. Aiming to improve educational opportunities for disadvantaged
children, several countries, including the U.S., have recently expanded choice in their
education systems (e.g., through charter schools, school-voucher programs, or universal
child care). A fundamental challenge with such formally non-selective programs is that
lower-SES families are less able to access and utilize these programs (e.g., Heckman and
Landersø, 2021). In consequence, the programs’ effects on educational equality often fall
short of expectations. Our results show that an important mechanism behind this pattern
is that lower-SES families have difficulties navigating complex application processes. This
finding is in line with Walters (2018), who suggests that a lack of familiarity with appli-
cation processes may explain why lower-SES children are often underrepresented in U.S.
charter schools. Therefore, alleviating behavioral barriers by simplifying application pro-
cesses (e.g., reducing paperwork, centralizing the admission system, and providing more
accessible information) can be a simple but effective strategy to strengthen the desired
equity-enhancing impacts of universal social programs.
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Appendix A. Socioeconomic Gaps at Baseline
Table A1: SES Gaps in Application Knowledge (Baseline)
Indices Correct Answer to Question on...
Mean # Correct Legal claim Age legal claim Financial support Age cost free Apply to 1 center Nearest center
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lower-SES -0.436*** -0.602*** -0.114*** -0.054** -0.198*** -0.025 -0.177*** -0.034
(0.086) (0.113) (0.036) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.028)
Mean Higher-SES 0.166 3.703 0.803 0.151 0.657 0.620 0.586 0.886
N 607 607 607 607 607 607 607 607
Notes: Table shows SES gaps in application knowledge at baseline, all models are estimated by OLS. We regress each outcome on a dummy variable indicating lower-SES.
The constant is reported as ‘Mean Higher-SES’. In Column (1), the outcome is an index that combines answers to all six application knowledge questions to an average of
z-scores (standardized to mean = 0 and SD = 1 in the control group, Kling et al., 2007). In Column (2), the outcome is a simple count of the number of correct answers. In
Columns (3)–(8), we report results for each knowledge question separately (using linear probability models, the outcome variable is equal to one if answered correctly and zero
otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
Table A2: SES Gaps in Parent–Child Activities (Baseline)
Picture books Read stories Sing songs Watch TV/videos Paint/play at home Walk outside Go to playground Visit other families
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lower-SES -0.075* -0.069* -0.122*** 0.209*** 0.046 0.019 0.103** 0.078*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.026) (0.039) (0.041) (0.012) (0.040) (0.041)
Mean Higher-SES 0.603 0.638 0.954 0.257 0.506 0.966 0.298 0.422
N 588 589 601 599 596 606 586 604
Notes: Table shows SES gaps in parent–child activities at baseline, all models are estimated by OLS. We regress each outcome on a dummy variable indicating lower-SES. The constant is
reported as ‘Mean Higher-SES’. The outcome in each column is a dummy variable equal to one if parents report that they conduct the respective activity “daily” or “several times a week”,
zero otherwise (the residual category includes “once a week,” “less than once a week,” and “never”). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Appendix B. Sample Selection
Table B1: Selection into Analytical Sample (Baseline)
Participants Non-participants ∆(2)-(1) p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child characteristics
Age of child (in months) 6.869 7.220 0.351 0.030
Child is female 0.484 0.484 -0.001 0.980
Migration background 0.409 0.515 0.106 0.000
German citizenship 0.832 0.792 -0.040 0.029
Parent characteristics
Age of mother (in years) 31.36 30.66 -0.70 0.006
Age of father (in years) 34.85 34.55 -0.30 0.463
Family background
Child with both parents in data 0.712 0.720 0.008 0.688
Child lives with both parents 0.695 0.683 -0.013 0.557
Mother is first-time parent 0.680 0.570 -0.111 0.000
Father is first-time parent 0.648 0.541 -0.107 0.000
Number of siblings 0.369 0.475 0.106 0.000
Area of Residence
Zip code area 1 0.076 0.092 0.016 0.224
Zip code area 2 0.105 0.097 -0.008 0.561
Zip code area 3 0.170 0.170 0.000 0.991
Zip code area 4 0.094 0.090 -0.004 0.785
Zip code area 5 0.063 0.057 -0.005 0.627
Zip code area 6 0.079 0.081 0.002 0.871
Zip code area 7 0.125 0.123 -0.002 0.897
Zip code area 8 0.061 0.077 0.016 0.196
Zip code area 9 0.066 0.056 -0.010 0.352
Zip code area 10 0.071 0.060 -0.010 0.352
Zip code area 11 0.021 0.030 0.009 0.242
Zip code area 12 0.069 0.066 -0.003 0.778
N 607 1972
Notes: Table compares mean values for sociodemographic characteristics and regional distribution between our
analytical sample (n = 607) and the remaining birth cohort (n = 1, 972) in the two participating cities at baseline.
Column (1) reports mean values for our analytical sample, Column (2) reports mean values for the remaining sample
from the birth cohort that is not part of our analytical sample, and Column (3) reports the difference between both
groups. In Column (4), we display the corresponding p-value for a two-sided t-test of the null hypothesis that values
in Columns (1) and (2) are equal. Age of the child is the child’s age measured in months on August 1, 2018. Female
is a dummy equal to one if the child is female, zero otherwise. Migration background is a dummy equal to one if the
child has any citizenship other than the German (more than one citizenship is possible), zero otherwise. German
citizenship is a dummy equal to one if the child has a German citizenship, zero otherwise. Child with both parents
in data is a dummy equal to one if the child is linked to both parents in the administrative data, zero otherwise.
Child lives with both parents is a dummy equal to one if both parents linked with the child are registered at the
same address, zero otherwise. Mother/father is first-time parent is equal to one if the mother/father is not linked
with another child in the administrative data, zero otherwise; note that these data contain information only on
children born after June 1, 2012 (i.e., six years before the youngest children in our study are born, see Section 3.2)
Number of siblings is the number of other children (born after June 1, 2012) linked with the parents of children in
our sample.
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Full-Cohort Weights. To check whether the observed differences between our baseline
sample and the full birth cohort affect our results, we apply propensity score weights
reflecting the probability of participating in our study. Weights are estimated from a
probit model of a binary participation variable (indicating whether the family participated
in our baseline survey) regressed on all variables included in Table B1. After applying
these weights, all observed differences between our baseline sample and the sample of non-
participating families become very small and statistically insignificant, suggesting a high
quality of the propensity score matching. The re-weighted treatment effect estimates are
reported in Table B2. The treatment effects are very similar to those in the unweighted
regression, suggesting that selective participation in the study does not bias our results.
Table B2: Treatment Effects on Child Care Application and Enrollment Using Full-Cohort Weights
Applied Enrolled
Unweighted Full Cohort Weights Unweighted Full Cohort Weights
Treatment 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.159** 0.166***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.062) (0.060)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.214** -0.199** -0.171** -0.202**
(0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.085)
Higher-SES 0.179*** 0.166** 0.221*** 0.228***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.000 0.010 -0.011 -0.037
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.045) (0.060) (0.061)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.835 0.497 0.487
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.642 0.216 0.210
Control Mean SES Gap 0.218 0.192 0.280 0.277
N 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows treatment effects using propensity score weights to account for selection into our study. The
dependent variables are child care application in Columns (1) and (2) and child care enrollment in Columns (3) and
(4). Regressions in Columns (2) and (4) are re-weighted according to the full birth cohort in the two sample cities.
Weights are derived from a probit model of a binary participation variable (indicating whether the family participated
in the baseline survey) regressed on all variables included in Table B1. Further controls include baseline outcome value,
survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for
missing values in control variables are included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective
outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap
reports the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. In Columns (2) and (4), control means
are re-weighted according to the full birth cohort. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10,
** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Appendix C. Further Results
Table C1: Treatment Effect on Hours in Child Care












Control Mean Higher-SES 13.756
Control Mean Lower-SES 6.116
Control Mean SES Gap 7.640
N 497
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on hours in
child care, estimated by OLS. The outcome is measured in
the post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment.
For children enrolled in child care, hours are measured as
the average number of hours per week that the child spends
in child care (realized or planned); for children not enrolled
in child care, hours are zero. The number of observations
is smaller than in our main specification because the infor-
mation on hours in child care is missing for some families.
Further controls include baseline outcome value, survey date
fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see
Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing val-
ues in control variables are included. Control Mean Higher-
SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in
the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-
SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports
the difference between control means of higher- and lower-
SES parents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif-
icance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Table C2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Child Care Enrollment
High Child Age Migration Background Low Application Knowledge High Return Beliefs High Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment (Lower-SES, heterogeneity = 1) 0.219** 0.278*** 0.213*** 0.220*** 0.278***
(0.099) (0.101) (0.082) (0.084) (0.099)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.120 -0.398*** -0.162 -0.271** -0.319**
(0.133) (0.126) (0.121) (0.118) (0.124)
Higher-SES 0.153 0.332*** 0.202** 0.359*** 0.279***
(0.097) (0.092) (0.092) (0.086) (0.085)
Below-median (Low) child age -0.120
(0.157)
Treatment × Low child age -0.128
(0.128)
Higher-SES × Low child age 0.113
(0.131)
Treatment × Higher-SES × Low child age -0.087
(0.175)
No migration background (Native) 0.152*
(0.088)
Treatment × Native -0.181
(0.131)
Higher-SES × Native -0.174
(0.124)
Treatment × Higher-SES × Native 0.362**
(0.166)
Above-median (High) Application knowledge 0.124
(0.097)
Treatment × High knowledge -0.121
(0.133)
Higher-SES × High knowledge 0.020
(0.127)
Treatment × Higher-SES × High knowledge 0.017
(0.176)
Below-median (Low) return beliefs 0.121
(0.092)
Treatment × Low return beliefs -0.142
(0.129)
Higher-SES × Low return beliefs -0.283**
(0.127)
Treatment × Higher-SES × Low return beliefs 0.225
(0.169)
Below-median (Low) competition 0.108
(0.091)
Treatment × Low competition -0.222*
(0.132)
Higher-SES × Low competition -0.111
(0.125)
Treatment × Higher-SES × Low competition 0.288
(0.181)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment (Lower-SES, heterogeneity = 0) 0.092 0.097 0.093 0.078 0.057
(0.073) (0.080) (0.100) (0.095) (0.083)
Treatment (Higher-SES, heterogeneity = 1) 0.100 -0.121 0.051 -0.052 -0.041
(0.090) (0.085) (0.092) (0.085) (0.080)
Treatment (Higher-SES, heterogeneity = 0) -0.115 0.060 -0.053 0.031 0.026
(0.080) (0.077) (0.076) (0.079) (0.090)
N 519 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows heterogeneity in intention-to-treat effects on enrollment in child care, all models estimated by OLS. Child care enrollment is measured in the post-treatment
survey nine months after the treatment. Column (1) reports heterogeneity based on a dummy variable indicating above-median age of the child. In Column (2), migration background
is equal to one if the parent was not born in Germany, zero otherwise. In Column (3), the dummy variable indicating low application knowledge is equal to one for parents with a
below-median application knowledge index at baseline, zero otherwise. Beliefs about the returns to child care in Column (4) are based on the following question from the baseline
survey: “Children who have been enrolled in child care show better development when starting school than children who have not been enrolled”. The dummy variable indicating high
return beliefs is equal to one for parents with above-median return beliefs, zero otherwise. Column (5) reports our findings for treatment effect heterogeneity by the level of competition
for child care slots. To calculate competition for slots, we divide the number of child care centers within a one-mile radius of each family’s home by the number of children aged 0–1
years at baseline living in that area. The dummy variable indicating high competition for child care slots is equal to one if parents live in an area with a below-median number of
child care centers per 100 children (within each of the two sample cities), zero otherwise. Further controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of
sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Table C3: Detailed Treatment Effects on Application Knowledge
Indices Correct Answer to Question on...
Mean Factor # Correct Legal Claim Age Legal Claim Financial Support Age Cost Free Apply to 1 Center Nearest Center
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment 0.299** 0.036** 0.378** -0.099 0.157*** 0.010 0.118* 0.035 0.129*
(0.151) (0.015) (0.190) (0.061) (0.056) (0.079) (0.061) (0.045) (0.077)
Treatment × Higher-SES 0.103 0.004 0.117 0.170** -0.027 0.013 0.053 -0.001 -0.049
(0.190) (0.018) (0.234) (0.074) (0.077) (0.098) (0.077) (0.056) (0.095)
Higher-SES 0.064 0.006 0.089 -0.049 0.078 0.035 0.001 -0.023 0.036
(0.135) (0.013) (0.169) (0.058) (0.052) (0.074) (0.059) (0.039) (0.072)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect 0.402*** 0.040*** 0.495*** 0.071 0.131** 0.023 0.171*** 0.034 0.079
Higher-SES (0.115) (0.011) (0.140) (0.043) (0.053) (0.060) (0.048) (0.027) (0.054)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.143 -0.003 3.837 0.830 0.163 0.673 0.626 0.912 0.633
Control Mean Lower-SES -0.217 -0.042 3.330 0.856 0.062 0.619 0.402 0.918 0.474
Control Group SES Gap 0.361 0.039 0.507 -0.026 0.101 0.055 0.224 -0.006 0.158
N 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on application knowledge, all models are estimated by OLS. Outcomes are measured in the post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment. In
Column (1), the outcome is an index that combines answers to all six application knowledge questions to an average of z-scores (standardized to mean = 0 and SD = 1 in the control group, Kling et al.,
2007). In Column (2), the outcome is based on a factor analysis using all six knowledge questions, which allows for unequal weights for the different items. The outcome in Column (3) is the simple
count of correct answers. In Columns (4)–(9), we report results for each individual knowledge question (using linear probability models, the outcome variable is equal to one if the respective question
was answered correctly, zero otherwise). ‘Legal Claim’ in Column (4) refers to the item “Parents have a legal claim to a child care slot.” (answer categories: true/false/don’t know). ‘Age Legal Claim’ in
Column (5) refers to the item “At what age do you think a child has a legal claim for a child care slot?” (answer categories: [. . . ] years/don’t know). ‘Financial Support’ in Column (6) refers to the item
“Low-income families are financially supported by the state in paying the fees for a slot in child care.” (answer categories: true/false/don’t know). ‘Age Cost Free’ in Column (7) refers to the item “At
what age is enrollment in a child care center in Rhineland-Palatinate free of charge?” (answer categories: from the day of birth/from the age of one year/from the age of two years/from the age of three
years/never/don’t know). ‘Apply to 1 Center’ in Column (8) refers to the item “Parents may only apply for a child care slot at one child care center at a time.” (answer categories: true/false/don’t know).
‘Nearest Center’ in Column (9) refers to the item “Parents are required by law to always choose the nearest child care center for their children.” (answer categories: true/false/don’t know). Further
controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are
included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap
reports the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Table C4: Treatment Effects on Application Behavior — Count Variables
#Applications #Visits #Calls #Emails
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.305** 0.896** 0.501 -0.344
(0.602) (0.383) (0.504) (0.379)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.744 -1.047** -0.503 0.563
(0.798) (0.450) (0.666) (0.526)
Higher-SES 1.010* 0.405 1.026** 0.070
(0.569) (0.359) (0.461) (0.412)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect 0.562 -0.150 -0.003 0.218
Higher-SES (0.537) (0.261) (0.451) (0.321)
Control Mean Higher-SES 3.821 2.007 1.897 0.671
Control Mean Lower-SES 2.600 1.454 1.134 0.821
Control Mean SES Gap 1.221 0.553 0.763 -0.150
N 511 515 514 514
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on application behavior measured by
count variables, all models are estimated by OLS. Outcomes are measured in the
post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment. In Column (1), the outcome
is the number of applications that parents have sent to child care centers (winsorized
at the 95th percentile). In Column (2), the outcome is the number of child care
centers that parents have visited on-site during the application process (winsorized
at the 95th percentile). Columns (3) and (4) report results for the number of calls
and emails that parents have sent to child care centers during the application process
(both winsorized at the 95th percentile). Further controls include baseline outcome
value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Sec-
tion 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are
included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective out-
come in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES)
parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference between control means of
higher- and lower-SES parents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Table C5: Treatment Effects on Parents’ Child Care Preferences
Enrollment Age < 3y Enrollment Age Willingness to Pay
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.053 0.679 0.740
(0.071) (1.815) (21.651)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.019 0.261 -17.212
(0.085) (2.209) (26.685)
Higher-SES 0.037 -0.717 36.473**
(0.065) (1.624) (18.503)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect 0.034 0.940 -16.472
Higher-SES (0.044) (1.255) (14.347)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 22.728 213.397
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.711 27.351 144.459
Control Group SES Gap 0.146 -4.623 68.937
N 519 519 437
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on parental preferences for child care enrollment, all models are
estimated by OLS. Outcomes are measured in the post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment.
In Column (1), the outcome is a dummy variable equal to one if parents plan to enroll their child to child
care (or have done so already) below the age of three years, zero otherwise. Column (2) uses the planned
enrollment age (in months) on a continuous scale as an outcome. In Column (3), the outcome is the stated
willingness to pay for a child care slot (in EUR) per month. Further controls include baseline outcome value,
survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation
dummies for missing values in control variables are included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the
mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-
SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES
parents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Appendix D. Mediation Analysis
Table D1: Treatment Effects on Child Care Enrollment with Mediators
Channel 1: Channel 2: Channel 3: All Three
Main Applied Knowledge Visits Channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment 0.157** 0.092 0.137** 0.090 0.078
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.171** -0.106 -0.187** -0.100 -0.107
(0.086) (0.083) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084)
Higher-SES 0.223*** -0.000 0.220*** 0.102 0.023
(0.065) (0.069) (0.066) (0.074) (0.077)
Applied (y/n) 0.264*** 0.224*
(0.056) (0.114)
Application knowledge 0.034 0.002
(0.032) (0.035)
Visited (y/n) 0.224*** 0.058
(0.060) (0.118)
Mediator × Higher-SES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 515 515 515 515 515
Notes: Table shows the models estimated from Equation (2), which are the basis for calculating
the share of the treatment effect explained by specific mediators in our mediation analysis (see
Section 4.3). We consider the following mediators: Applied (y/n) takes a value of one if respondents
state that they have applied for child care, zero otherwise; Application knowledge is an index that
combines answers to all six application knowledge questions to an average of z-scores (standardized
to mean = 0 and SD = 1 in the control group, Kling et al., 2007); Visited (y/n) is a dummy equal
to one if parents visited a child care center on-site during the application process, zero otherwise.
Column (1) replicates the main treatment effect on enrollment in child care from Column (4) of
Table 2, using the sample for which we have information on all mediators (N = 515). In Columns
(2)–(4), we add each mediator separately (corresponding to the upper three bars in Figure 4). In
Column (5), we include all three mediators jointly (corresponding to the bottom bar of Figure 4).
In all specifications, we also include interaction terms of the mediator variable with the higher-
SES dummy, allowing the mediators to differentially affect enrollment for lower- and higher-SES
families. Further controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of
sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in
control variables are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10,
** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Appendix E. Robustness Checks
Table E1: Randomization Inference and Corrections for Multiple Hypothesis Testing
Coefficient Rand. Inference List-Shaikh-Xu Westphal-Young Romano-Wolf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Child Care Application and Enrollment (Table 2)
Applied pooled 0.078** 0.044 0.090 0.083 0.072
Enrolled pooled 0.051 0.218 0.265 0.237 0.239
Applied Lower-SES 0.213*** 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005
Enrolled Lower-SES 0.159** 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.006
Panel B: Heterogeneity Results (Figure 3 & Table C2), Treatment × Lower-SES × Heterogeneity
Child age high 0.219** 0.036 0.025 0.025
Migration background 0.278*** 0.008 0.011 0.022
Low knowledge 0.213** 0.003 0.023 0.022
High return beliefs 0.220*** 0.016 0.015 0.019
High competition 0.278*** 0.007 0.016 0.022
Panel C: Application Knowledge and Behavior (Table 3)
Application knowledge 0.299** 0.051 0.134 0.112 0.113
Visits (y/n) 0.259*** 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007
Calls (y/n) 0.087 0.240 0.275 0.284 0.284
Emails (y/n) −0.079 0.134 0.320 0.284 0.284
Notes: Table shows p-values for our main results when using randomization inference and adjusting for multiple hypothesis
testing. All p-values < .10 are printed in bold. For comparison, Column (1) displays coefficients and significance stars repre-
senting p-values from robust standard errors (* p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01) as reported in the main tables. Randomization
inference (RI) p-values in Column (2) are obtained from RI with 1,000 permutations, assigning the treatment status randomly
within strata (using the Stata command ‘ritest’ by Hess, 2017). In Columns (3)–(5), we implement three different meth-
ods to correct for multiple hypothesis testing (controlling the family-wise error rates) using bootstrap resampling techniques.
Column (3) uses the method by List et al. (2019), Column (4) the stepdown-approach by Westfall and Young (1993), and
Column (5) the approach by Romano and Wolf (2005, 2016). The procedures by Westfall-Young (using the Stata command
‘wyoung’ by Julian Reif) and Romano-Wolf (using the Stata command ‘rwolf’ by Clarke et al. (2020)) account for the stratified
randomization, that is, bootstrap samples are selected within each stratum. In Panel A, we correct for the fact that we use two
main outcomes, child care application and enrollment. In Panel B, we correct for the multiple subgroups tested. In Panel C, we
correct for the four different intermediate outcomes. For Romano-Wolf, we do not report values for interacted models because
the Stata command does not allow for a heterogeneity analysis. Note that some corrected p-values are smaller than the original
p-values because they are based on bootstrap methods. We do not report adjusted p-values for higher-SES families because of
their insignificance in the main analysis. All control variables from the respective baseline specification are included.
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Table E2: Treatment Effects on Child Care Application and Enrollment with Alternative SES Definitions
Applied Enrolled
SES-1 (main) SES-2 SES-3 SES-4 SES-1 (main) SES-2 SES-3 SES-4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.213*** 0.209** 0.113* 0.122* 0.159** 0.203*** 0.163*** 0.154***
(0.072) (0.085) (0.065) (0.064) (0.062) (0.067) (0.058) (0.058)
Higher-SES-1 (main = responding parent has college entrance qualification) 0.179*** 0.221***
(0.066) (0.064)
Treatment × Higher-SES-1 (main) -0.214** -0.171**
(0.086) (0.085)
Higher-SES-2 (at least one parent in HH has college entrance qualification) 0.119 0.107
(0.097) (0.092)
Treatment × Higher-SES-2 -0.182* -0.212**
(0.096) (0.087)
Higher-SES-3 (HH has college entrance qualification and not poor) 0.033 0.137
(0.083) (0.087)
Treatment × Higher-SES-3 -0.062 -0.199**
(0.079) (0.086)
Higher-SES-4 (HH has college entrance qualification, not poor, and no single parent) 0.046 0.145*
(0.078) (0.083)
Treatment × Higher-SES-4 -0.079 -0.186**
(0.078) (0.085)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.000 0.027 0.051 0.043 -0.011 -0.009 -0.036 -0.032
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.056) (0.064) (0.064)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.837 0.865 0.870 0.497 0.488 0.586 0.588
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.611 0.658 0.655 0.216 0.139 0.144 0.150
Control Group SES Gap 0.218 0.226 0.207 0.215 0.280 0.349 0.442 0.437
N 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows our main results from Table 2 for different definitions of lower-SES families, see Section 4.4 for details. Columns (1) and (5) report results for our main definition of lower-SES families used
throughout the paper (the responding parent not having a college entrance qualification, SES-1). In Columns (2) and (6), we define lower-SES as neither parent having a college entrance qualification (SES-2, 30%
of the full sample). Columns (3) and (7) extend the definition for SES-2 by adding families with an equivalent household income below poverty line to the lower-SES sample (SES-3, 45% of the full sample, based
on Falk et al. (2021)). Finally, Columns (4) and (8) extend the definition for SES-3 by adding single-parent families to the lower-SES sample (SES-4, 46% of the full sample, following Kosse et al. (2020)). Further
controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are included.
Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference
between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Table E3: Treatment Effects on Application and Enrollment If Respondents Named a Child Care
Center
Nine Months After Treatment
Applied Applied (named CC) Enrolled Enrolled (named CC)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.213*** 0.225*** 0.159** 0.160***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.062) (0.059)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.214** -0.254*** -0.171** -0.168**
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.083)
Higher-SES 0.179*** 0.210*** 0.221*** 0.197***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.061)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.000 -0.029 -0.011 -0.007
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.837 0.497 0.456
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.588 0.216 0.196
Control Mean SES Gap 0.218 0.249 0.280 0.260
N 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows intention-to-treat effects on child care application and enrollment, all models are estimated by
OLS. Columns (1) and (3) show our main treatment effects from Table 2 . In Columns (2) and (4), the dummy
variables indicating child care application and enrollment are equal to one if parents could name a specific child care
center to which they have applied to or in which their child is enrolled; zero otherwise. Specifically, 96% of parents
who stated that they applied for a child care slot named at least one child care center (95.7% in the treatment group,
95.5% in the control group); 93% of parents who stated that their child is enrolled in child care named the specific
child care center (94.3% in the treatment group, 91.5% in the control group). Further controls include baseline
outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details).
Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES)
is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES)
parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Appendix E.1. Attrition Analysis
All families who participated in the baseline survey were invited to take part in the
post-treatment survey about nine months after the treatment. In total, 85.5% of the
families (519 out of 607) decided to do so. In this section, we examine robustness to
attrition in several ways. First, Table E4 shows that attrition is not selective based on
treatment assignment or baseline outcomes. To construct the table, we regress an indicator
of participation in the post-treatment survey on the treatment indicator, a higher-SES
indicator, the baseline outcomes (i.e., enrollment in child care and application knowledge),
and the interactions of the treatment indicator with the baseline variables. All coefficients
are small and statistically insignificant. Hence, there is no evidence for selective attrition.
Second, Table E5 shows that the sample participating in the post-treatment survey
is well balanced on baseline characteristics. This suggests that attrition is not causing
treatment and control group to differ on pre-existing characteristics.
Taken together, the evidence in Tables E4 and E5 indicates that treatment and control
group remain comparable in the post-treatment survey. However, we further examine the
sensitivity of our results to attrition in two additional robustness checks.
Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW). We re-weight the observed data using the inverse
probability of participation in the post-treatment survey. Due to this re-weighting, non-
attriters become observationally similar to attriters. In a first step, we calculate the
predicted probability of responding to the post-treatment survey from a probit model of a
binary participation indicator regressed on treatment assignment (potentially interacted
with the higher-SES indicator) and the baseline outcome. Then, we estimate our baseline
models with attrition weights (i.e., the inverse of the probabilities obtained from the probit
model). The re-weighted results for child care application and enrollment are shown in
Table E6. Treatment effect sizes are virtually identical to the unweighted results.
Lee Bounds. IPW relies on the assumption that, conditional on observables, attrition is
independent of the outcome. This arguably strong assumption is relaxed in the trimming
procedure suggested by Lee (2009). This approach yields an interval for the true value of
the treatment effect in the presence of non-random attrition. Interval estimates are based
on extreme assumptions about selection: In the group that suffers less from attrition, ei-
ther the largest or the smallest values of the outcome are regarded as “excess observations”
and are excluded from the analysis. In Table E7, we show Lee bounds when we correct
for attrition that differs between treatment and control group. Lee bounds reported in
Table E8 conservatively correct for treatment–control differences in attrition separately in
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the lower- and higher-SES samples. Because attrition is always very similar in treatment
and control group (also when we split the sample by SES), only few “excess observations”
need to be excluded from the estimation samples (four in Table E7 and eleven in Table
E8). Thus, the lower and upper bounds are both reasonably close to the point estimates
of our treatment effects displayed in Table 2, and are statistically significant at 5% or
better.
Table E4: Check for Selective Attrition
Participation Post-Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.004 0.029 0.031
(0.017) (0.026) (0.029)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.057 -0.064
(0.036) (0.039)
Higher-SES 0.016 0.045 0.044
(0.021) (0.028) (0.030)
Treatment × Enrolled in child care (baseline) 0.114
(0.187)
Enrolled in child care (baseline) -0.067
(0.055)
Treatment × Application knowledge (baseline) 0.015
(0.024)
Application knowledge (baseline) 0.018
(0.020)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes
N 607 607 607
Attrition F-test p-values
Overall sample 0.828 0.281 0.460
Lower-SES sample 0.268 0.373
Higher-SES sample 0.235 0.598
Notes: Table shows results from OLS models. The outcome variable takes a value of one
if the family participates in the post-treatment survey nine months after treatment, zero
otherwise. Further controls include survey date fixed effects and a vector of sociodemo-
graphic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in
control variables are included. F-test p-values report p-values from joint significance tests
of all treatment-related coefficients for the indicated sample. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Table E5: Sample Descriptives and Balancing Tests of Baseline Variables in Post-Treatment Sample
All Control Treatment ∆(3)-(2) p-val for (4) p-val by SES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-treatment outcomes
Enrolled in child care 0.013 0.016 0.011 -0.005 0.594 0.349
Application knowledge (# corr.) 3.545 3.545 3.545 0.000 0.997 0.796
Application knowledge (Index) 0.057 0.047 0.065 0.018 0.837 0.714
Child characteristics
Age of child (in months) 6.839 7.012 6.684 -0.328 0.293 0.592
Child is female 0.487 0.480 0.495 0.015 0.733 0.934
Parent characteristics
Parent is female 0.933 0.943 0.924 -0.019 0.387 0.447
Age of parent (in years) 31.74 31.33 32.11 0.78 0.091 0.203
Migration background 0.380 0.373 0.385 0.013 0.770 0.829
Parent currently working 0.098 0.107 0.091 -0.016 0.553 0.651
Household income 1421.4 1376.0 1461.6 85.6 0.221 0.353
No school degree 0.039 0.029 0.047 0.019 0.266
Lower secondary degree 0.112 0.111 0.113 0.002 0.941
Middle secondary degree 0.231 0.242 0.222 -0.020 0.591
College entrance qualification 0.611 0.602 0.618 0.016 0.715
N 519 244 275
Notes: Table reports mean values for outcomes and sociodemographic characteristics at baseline in our sample of
respondents who participated in the post-treatment survey nine months after treatment. Column (1) reports mean
values for the full sample, Column (2) mean values for the control group, and Column (3) mean values for the treatment
group. In Column (4), we display the difference between treatment and control group, and Column (5) shows the
corresponding p-value for a two-sided t-test of the hypothesis that values in Columns (2) and (3) are equal. In
Column (6), we test whether there are treatment–control differences in the respective variable within SES subgroups.
To do so, we regress the variable on the treatment indicator, the higher-SES dummy, and their interaction. Column (6)
reports the p-value of an F-test of joint significance of the coefficients on the treatment indicator and its interaction
with the higher-SES dummy. Enrolled in child care is a dummy equal to one if parents report that their child is enrolled
in child care, zero otherwise. Application knowledge (# corr.) is the average number of knowledge questions about
the child care application process answered correctly (out of six questions in total). Application knowledge (Index)
combines answers to all six application knowledge questions to an average of z-scores (standardized to mean = 0 and SD
= 1 in the control group, Kling et al., 2007). Age of the child is the child’s age measured in months on August 1, 2018.
Female is a dummy equal to one if the child is female, zero otherwise. Parent is mother is a dummy equal to one if the
interviewee is the child’s biological mother, zero otherwise (the remaining cases are all biological fathers). Migration
background is a dummy equal to one if the parent was not born in Germany, zero otherwise. Parent currently working is
a dummy equal to one if the parent was working at baseline (part-time or full-time), zero otherwise. Household income
is the monthly equivalent household income in EUR. No school degree, Lower secondary degree, Middle secondary
degree (“MSA”), and College entrance qualification (“Abitur”) are all dummy variables indicating a parent’s highest
school degree.
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Table E6: Treatment Effects on Child Care Application and Enrollment Using Inverse Probability Weighting
Applied Enrolled
Unweighted Baseline Sample Weights I Baseline Sample Weights II Unweighted Baseline Sample Weights I Baseline Sample Weights II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.159** 0.159** 0.156**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.214** -0.213** -0.214** -0.171** -0.170** -0.169**
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Higher-SES 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.221***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.497 0.497 0.497
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.216 0.216 0.216
Control Mean SES Gap 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.280 0.280 0.280
N 519 519 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows treatment effects using inverse probability weighting to account for attrition. The dependent variable is child care application in Columns (1)–(3) and child care enrollment
in Columns (4)–(6). Coefficients are weighted least squares estimates, with attrition weights being the inverse of the predicted probability of responding in the post-treatment survey. In Columns
(2) and (5), the probability of responding is derived from a probit model of the binary participation indicator as function of treatment assignment and pre-treatment outcome; in Columns
(3) and (6), the probability of responding is derived from a probit model of the binary participation indicator as function of treatment assignment, higher-SES indicator, their interaction,
and pre-treatment outcome. Further controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation
dummies for missing values in control variables are included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the post-treatment survey
for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Table E7: Treatment Effect Bounds (Correcting for Potentially Selective Attrition by
Treatment Status)
Applied Enrolled
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.211*** 0.227*** 0.163*** 0.165***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.062) (0.062)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.213** -0.219** -0.191** -0.175**
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
Higher-SES 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.227*** 0.223***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.002 0.007 -0.028 -0.010
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.043) (0.060) (0.060)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.857 0.497 0.497
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.639 0.216 0.216
Control Mean SES Gap 0.218 0.218 0.280 0.280
N 515 515 515 515
Notes: Table shows treatment effect bounds for child care application (Columns (1) and (2)) and
enrollment (Columns (3) and (4)). The bounds are estimated using the procedure suggested by Lee
(2009), which involves trimming observations from the group that experienced less attrition (i.e., either
the largest or the smallest values of the outcome are regarded as “excess observations” and are excluded
from the sample). The trimming analysis accounts for differences in attrition between treatment and
control group. The difference in participation rates between treatment and control group is 0.9 pp,
with a participation rate in the treatment group of 85.9%. Therefore, we trim .9/85.9 = 1.1% of the
treated observations (N = 4), with the lower bound occurring when we exclude families who do apply
or enroll, and the upper bound when we exclude families who do not apply or enroll. Further controls
include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls
(see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are included.
Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group
in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports
the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Table E8: Treatment Effect Bounds (Correcting for Potentially Selective Attrition by
Treatment Status and SES)
Applied Enrolled
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.200*** 0.246*** 0.121** 0.176***
(0.074) (0.072) (0.061) (0.064)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.193** -0.266*** -0.118 -0.201**
(0.088) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087)
Higher-SES 0.173** 0.197*** 0.210*** 0.227***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect 0.007 -0.020 0.003 -0.025
Higher-SES (0.045) (0.042) (0.060) (0.061)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.853 0.881 0.483 0.510
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.639 0.216 0.216
Control Mean SES Gap 0.214 0.242 0.266 0.294
N 508 508 508 508
Notes: Table shows treatment effect bounds for child care application (Columns (1) and (2)) and
enrollment (Columns (3) and (4)). The bounds are estimated using the procedure suggested by Lee
(2009), which involves trimming observations from the group that experienced less attrition (i.e., either
the largest or the smallest values of the outcome are regarded as “excess observations” and are excluded
from the sample). The trimming analysis accounts for differences in attrition between treatment and
control group by SES. The difference in participation rates between treatment and control group is 4.4
pp in the lower-SES sample (leading to the exclusion of 5.4% (N = 7) treated lower-SES observations)
and is –2.4 pp in the higher-SES sample (leading to the exclusion of 2.6% (N = 4) control group higher-
SES observations). The lower bound occurs when we trim observations for parents who do apply or
enroll, and the upper bound when we trim observations for parents who do not apply or enroll. Further
controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic
controls (see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables
are included. Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the
control group in the post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES
Gap reports the difference between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Appendix E.2. Representativeness
To further investigate the representativeness of our results, we use data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (Goebel et al., 2019). These annually collected
data are representative of the German population, with about 15,000 households and
30,000 individuals participating in the survey. We restrict the SOEP sample to the target
population of our study, that is, mothers with children born in 2017 and 2018 in Germany
(n = 502 mothers). We add our study sample to the SOEP data and construct propensity
score weights from a probit model of a binary variable indicating whether the family
participated in our baseline survey regressed on migration background, SES, net equivalent
household income, and current employment status. Treatment effect estimates with these
SOEP population weights are very similar to the unweighted estimates (see Table E9).
Table E9: Treatment Effects on Child Care Application and Enrollment Using SOEP Pop-
ulation Weights
Applied Enrolled
Unweighted SOEP Weights Unweighted SOEP Weights
Treatment 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.159** 0.154**
(0.072) (0.071) (0.062) (0.066)
Treatment × Higher-SES -0.214** -0.214** -0.171** -0.174*
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.091)
Higher-SES 0.179*** 0.176*** 0.221*** 0.217***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.067)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect -0.000 -0.002 -0.011 -0.020
Higher-SES (0.044) (0.043) (0.060) (0.063)
Control Mean Higher-SES 0.857 0.867 0.497 0.516
Control Mean Lower-SES 0.639 0.651 0.216 0.237
Control Mean SES Gap 0.218 0.216 0.280 0.279
N 519 519 519 519
Notes: Table shows treatment effects using propensity score weights derived from representative German
survey data (German Socio-Economic Panel, SOEP). The dependent variable is child care application in
Columns (1) and (2) and child care enrollment in Columns (3) and (4). Regressions in Columns (2) and
(4) are re-weighted such that our sample is representative of the overall population of mothers with young
children in Germany. Weights are derived from a probit model of a binary variable (0: SOEP mothers with
children born in 2017 and 2018; 1: families participating in our baseline survey (see Section 3.1)) regressed
on migration background, SES, net equivalent household income, and current employment status. Further
controls include baseline outcome value, survey date fixed effects, and a vector of sociodemographic controls
(see Section 3.5 for details). Imputation dummies for missing values in control variables are included.
Control Mean Higher-SES (Lower-SES) is the mean of the respective outcome in the control group in the
post-treatment survey for higher-SES (lower-SES) parents; Control Group SES Gap reports the difference
between control means of higher- and lower-SES parents. In Columns (2) and (4), control means are re-
weighted with the SOEP weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p< .10,
** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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Appendix E.3. Potential Displacement Effects
Table E10: Analysis of Potential Displacement Effects
Enrolled into Child Care
Control Only Only Control Only Only
Group Lower-SES Higher-SES Group Lower-SES Higher-SES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of households in treatment 0.004 -0.002 0.008
(0.015) (0.028) (0.019)
High share of households in treatment -0.038 -0.035 -0.039
(0.061) (0.101) (0.082)
Strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(High) Share of households in sample Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 244 97 147 244 97 147
Notes: Table analyzes potential displacement effects of treated participants on participants in the control group, all models are
estimated by OLS. The outcome variable takes a value of one if respondents state that they are enrolled in child care and zero
otherwise, measured in the post-treatment survey nine months after the treatment. In Columns (1) and (4), we estimate models
for the full control group; in Columns (2) and (5) (Columns (3) and (6)), we only use the subsample of lower-SES (higher-SES)
families. In this table, we use the exact location information about all households with a child aged 0–1 years in the cities we
study. In Columns (1)–(3), we control for the share of households that are in the treatment group within in an area of one mile
around the responding household; values range from 0 to 19%, mean: 13%. To account for areas with a generally higher or
lower participation in the study, we additionally control for the share of participating households (i.e., in treatment plus control
group) in this area; values range from 0 to 34%, mean: 23%. Columns (4)–(6) use — instead of the continuous variables from
Columns (1)–(3) — dummy variables taking a value of one if, within an area of one mile around the responding household,
there is an above-median share of households in the treatment group and in the full sample, respectively (zero otherwise). In
addition, we control for baseline outcome values and strata fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
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Appendix E.4. Survey of Child Care Center Managers in Germany
In Section 4.4, we provide evidence against the existence of displacement effects by
showing that the likelihood that a control-group family’s child is enrolled in child care
is unrelated to the share of treated households in the family’s vicinity. This raises the
question of how treated families in a rationed market were able to secure child care slots
without affecting other families’ chances of enrolling in child care. One potential reason for
the absence of displacement effects of our treatment are inefficiencies in the allocation of
slots in the German market for early child care, discussed in Section 2. These inefficiencies,
which mainly result from decentralized, non-transparent admission processes, could lead
to unfilled slots in child care — leaving room for treated families to enroll their child in
child care without negatively affecting other families’ enrollment chances.
Unfortunately, information about unfilled child care slots is not publicly available in
Germany. In an effort to better understand the process of allocating early child care
slots, we conducted a Germany-wide survey with child care center managers responsible
for selecting and admitting children to their centers. The sample was drawn from a
commercially available data set comprising contact details for nearly the universe of child
care centers in Germany. The data set comprises about 35,000 child care centers, and
approximately 90% of them provide child care for children below the age of three years.
We drew a randomly selected subset of child care centers among those targeting children
below the age of three years, and sent out email invitations to participate in our online
survey to 6,000 child care centers. We specifically asked the child care center manager to
take part in our survey. Managers who completed the survey received an unconditional
average cash incentive of 5 EUR. The survey was conducted in fall 2020, and we sent out
an initial invitation plus two reminder emails. In total, 440 child care center managers
participated in the survey.
The aim of the survey was to improve our understanding about the process of allocating
child care slots in Germany. For example, child care center managers reported the number
of unfilled slots and rated the importance of several application strategies, such as on-site
visits to the center. The distribution of unfilled slots for children below the age of three
years is displayed in Figure E1. On average, at the time of the survey, there was at least
one unfilled slot in more than half of the early child care centers (58%); about one-third
of the centers (37%) even report more than five open slots. Overall, the data suggest that
having unfilled slots (even several of them) is common for child care centers. Because the
early child care market is generally characterized by demand for slots exceeding supply, the
large numbers of unfilled slots that we document indicate substantial market inefficiencies
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in slot allocation. These inefficiencies leave room for an increased number of slots being
allocated to treated families without negatively affecting families in the control group (or
out-of-sample families).
In addition, we asked child care center managers to rate — on a scale from 1 “very
important” to 5 “very unimportant” — the importance of several application strategies
for successfully obtaining a child care slot in their center. Figure E2 shows the share of
child care center managers who consider a strategy to be very important or important
(values of 1 and 2). Almost three-quarters (74%) of managers emphasize that personal
on-site visits at the child care center are important or very important for securing a slot; a
much smaller share of managers considers phone calls (48%) or emails (38%) as important
or very important. These survey results indicate the relevance of on-site visits to child
care centers for obtaining a child care slot.
Figure E2: Importance of Different Application Strategies for Obtaining Child Care Slot






Appendix F. Experimental Material
Appendix F.1. Corporate Design
Figure F1: Study Logo and Examples for Design of Materials for Parents
61
Appendix F.2. Information Video Slides and Text
Figure F2: Slide 1 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Audio Slide 1: Who should take care of my child and where? Almost all parents with
young children in Germany face these questions.
Figure F3: Slide 2 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Child care: HOW and WHERE? 
There are many different ways to care for your child. 
 
You can choose! 
 
Basically you can … 
… look after your child yourself at home, 
… your child could attend a child care center, 
… or for example a nanny could take care of your 
child. 
Audio Slide 2: This short video summarizes the most important information about child
care for you. There are many different ways to care for your child. You can choose!
Basically, you can look after your child yourself at home, your child could attend a child
care center, or, for example, a nanny could take care of your child. The decision is entirely
up to you.
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Figure F4: Slide 3 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Access to a child care 
slot 
Audio Slide 3: Access to a child care slot.
Figure F5: Slide 4 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
 
 
In Germany, all parents have a legal entitlement for 
a child care slot for their children from their 1st 
birthday onward. 
 
This applies without exceptions. 
 
And this legal entitlement also applies regardless of 
whether the parents work or not! 
Audio Slide 4: Many parents think that their child cannot attend child care because there
are no slots available or it is too expensive. But is this really the case? In Germany, all
parents have a legal entitlement to a child care slot for their children from their first
birthday onward. This applies without exceptions. And the legal entitlement also applies
regardless of whether parents work or not.
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You can choose the child care center yourself. 
 
If you cannot find a place in the child care center of 
your choice, the following applies: 
 
Your city must offer you an alternative slot of 
child care. 
Audio Slide 5: You can choose the child care slot yourself. If you cannot find a slot
in a child care center of your choice, the following applies: your city must offer you an
alternative slot in child care, for example, at another child care center.
Figure F7: Slide 6 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Child care costs 
Audio Slide 6: Child care costs: Many parents think that a child care slot is very expensive.
But how much does a child care slot really cost?
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Figure F8: Slide 7 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
In Rhineland-Palatine, the costs for a 
child care slot are the lower… 
 
… the more children live in a household. 
 
… the lower the family income is. 
 
For families with several children or a lower income, 
the child care slot is even free or costs very little. 
 
From the 2nd birthday, child care is free of charge. 
Audio Slide 7: In Rhineland-Palatinate, the costs for a child care slot are the lower the
more children live in a household and the lower the family income is. For families with
several children or a lower household income, child care is often even free or costs very
little. From a child’s second birthday, child care is even free of charge.
Figure F9: Slide 8 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Application for child 
care slot 
Audio Slide 8: Application for a child care slot.
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Figure F10: Slide 9 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
• The application procedures for a child care slot 
may differ from city to city.  
 
• Apply early. 
 
• In many child care centers there is an application 
deadline. 
 
• The earlier you apply, the better. 
 
• Always apply to more than one child care center. 
Audio Slide 9: If you decide to apply for child care, finding a slot is really not rocket
science. The application procedures for a child care slot may differ from city to city.
However, the following always applies: apply early. This increases your chances of finding
a slot. In many child care centers, there is an application deadline. But even if there is no
application deadline, the earlier you apply, the better. In any case, apply to more than
one child care center! This will increase your chances of getting a slot at the child care
center of your choice.
Figure F11: Slide 10 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
There are more child care centers 
in your area than you might think! 
[Shown here: City maps with child care center locations] 
Audio Slide 10: Here you can see that there are more child care centers in your area than
you might think!
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Figure F12: Slide 11 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Once again summarized the man 
points: 
• It’s your choice. 
 
• You have a legal entitlement for a child care 
slot from the 1st birthday of your child.  
 
• The costs for a child care slot are very low in 
Rhineland-Palatine. 
 
• Search early and apply to more than one 
child care center.  
Audio Slide 11: Once again, we summarize the main points. It’s your choice whether you
want to care for your child yourself at home or whether you want to enroll your child in
child care. You have a legal entitlement to child care from the day your child is one year
old. The costs for child care are very low in Rhineland-Palatinate, and, from the day
your child is two years old, child care is even free of charge. If you would like to enroll
your child in child care, search early and apply to more than one child care center. If you
have any questions or need support regarding child care, please contact our staff. We will
gladly help you!
Figure F13: Slide 12 of the Information Video Shown to the Treatment Group
Further Information 
 
[Shown here: Contact details] 
 
Thank you very much for your attention! 
Audio Slide 12: Further information can also be found at [webpage]. Thank you very
much for your attention! We wish you and your family all the best and thank you for
participating in the ELFE study.
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